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Abstract
The allocation of skilled labor across industries shapes inter-industry wage differences and wage
inequality. This paper shows the ranking of industries by workforce skill differs between developed
and developing countries and develops a multi-sector assignment model to understand the causes and
consequences of this fact. Heterogeneous agents leverage their ability through their span of control
over an homogeneous input. In equilibrium, higher skill agents sort into sectors where the cost per
efficiency unit of input is lower. Consequently, skill allocation is endogenous to country-sector specific
variation in input productivity and costs and when the ranking of sectors by effective input costs differs
across countries there is an assignment reversal. Assignment reversals between North and South have
novel implications for how trade affects wages because they imply the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does
not hold. Instead, each country has a comparative advantage in its high skill sector and output trade
integration causes the relative wage of high skill workers, and wage inequality within the high skill
sector, to increase in both countries.
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1 Introduction
For over half a century the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) theorem dominated analysis of the effects of
trade on wage inequality. In a Stolper-Samuelson world inter-industry trade raises wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers in relatively skill abundant countries and lowers inequality in relatively un-
skilled abundant countries.1 Contrary to this prediction many developing countries that liberalized trade in
the 1980s and 1990s experienced increases in wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). This observa-
tion has cast doubt on the empirical relevance of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and led to the emergence
of a literature documenting alternative channels through which trade may affect wage inequality.2 The
mechanisms identified in this literature are not driven by inter-industry output trade and could, in principle,
co-exist with Stolper-Samuelson effects. For example, Burstein and Vogel (2015) quantify the effects of
international trade on the skill premium in a model where trade induces both Stolper-Samuelson effects and
increased demand for skill within industries. By contrast, this paper challenges the logic underlying the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and shows why North-South trade between developed and developing countries
does not necessarily cause Stolper-Samuelson effects.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem relies on the assumption that the ranking of sectors by skill intensity
is the same in all countries. In the two country, two sector model this assumption guarantees that if one
country has a comparative advantage in the skill intensive sector, then the other country’s comparative
advantage must lie in unskilled labor intensive production. Variation in workforce skill across sectors is
usually explained by invoking cross-sector differences in production technologies that affect the demand
for skill. Both traditional multi-sector models, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and the more recent
comparative advantage assignment literature (Sattinger 1975; Ohnsorge and Trefler 2007; Costinot and
Vogel 2009; Acemoglu and Autor 2011) follow this approach. Open economy applications of these models
further assume there is no cross-country technology variation, at least in those parts of the technology that
affect the demand for skill. Consequently, the ranking of sectors by workforce skill is constant across
countries.
However, industry level data implies the ranking of sectors by workforce skill varies systematically
1Although originally derived in a canonical two country, two sector, two factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, variants of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem have been obtained in many different environments. See Costinot and Vogel (2010) for a recent example.
2Channels that have been highlighted in the literature include: intra-industry trade (Manasse and Turrini 2001; Yeaple 2005;
Sampson 2014); offshoring (Feenstra and Hanson 1996); capital trade (Csillag and Koren 2009; Parro 2013; Burstein, Cravino and
Vogel 2013), and; trade-induced expansion of skill intensive R&D activity (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999).
2
across countries. Define the “wage rank correlation” to be the rank correlation of a country’s industry
wages with industry wages in the US. Figure 1 shows wage rank correlations plotted against per capita
income.3 Although the correlation is always positive, it is strongly increasing in income per capita. While
industrialized countries have similar industry wage structures to the US, the industry wage ranking varies
substantially between low and high income countries. Section 2.1 shows that the correlation observed in
Figure 1 is a robust feature of industry wage data sets. Under the assumption that inter-industry wage
differences primarily reflect workforce skill,4 Figure 1 implies the existence of an important phenomenon:
assignment reversals. I define an assignment reversal to occur whenever the ranking of sectors by workforce
skill differs across countries.5
To explain assignment reversals Section 3 develops an assignment model in which worker sorting results
from variation in the effective cost of non-labor inputs across both countries and industries. This approach
is motivated by Section 2.3 which shows that, controlling for country and industry fixed effects, average
wages are higher in industries with lower capital costs. To isolate plausibly exogenous variation in the
cost of capital, I combine data on countries’ geographic proximity to major capital exporters and on the
composition of capital investment by industry to construct a measure of the cost of capital imports that
varies across industries within a country. The results imply that when an industry has cheaper access to
capital equipment, it employs higher skilled workers.
The assignment model builds upon the idea that skilled workers leverage their ability through their
span of control over other production inputs. This idea has motivated work on the allocation and pay
of managerial talent (Rosen 1982; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Gabaix and Landier 2008; Tervio¨
2008), but has not been used to study the allocation of skill across sectors. Formally, the model marries
Roy (1951) to Becker (1973) by allowing for both multiple sectors and matching between two factors of
production with non-zero opportunity costs: heterogeneous labor and an homogeneous non-labor input.
This assignment problem is new to the literature.6 Consider a competitive economy with a continuum of
3The wage data is from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database and covers 42 countries and 127 ISIC 4 digit manufacturing
industries in 2000. Income per capita is from the Penn World Tables 6.3. See Section 2.1 and Appendix C for a complete description
of the data.
4Krueger and Summers (1986) and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) document that inter-industry wage differences are
mostly due to variation in workforce composition. Cross-country data on workforce skill is not available at the level of disaggre-
gation used in Figure 1. However, Section 2.1 shows there exists cross-country variation in the ranking of industries by workforce
education at a more aggregate level.
5Kurokawa (2011) documents the existence of an assignment reversal between the US and Mexico.
6Sattinger (1979) considers the problem of matching heterogeneous workers to machines of different quality when all worker-
machine pairs produce the same output good and machines are in fixed supply. However, in existing models with multiple sectors
either production uses a single input as in comparative advantage assignment models such as Sattinger (1975) and Costinot and
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agents who differ along a single dimension of heterogeneity called skill and sort across a finite number of
sectors. In comparative advantage assignment models the production technology is assumed to take the
form:
y(θ, k) = g(θ)F (θ, k),
where y is the output of a skill θ agent working in sector k. Provided F is log-supermodular there is positive
assortative matching of high skill agents to high k sectors. I extend this framework by allowing agents to
work with an additional input which can be interpreted as materials, land or capital. A production team
comprising one agent working with input quantity x in sector k produces output:
y(θ, k) = g(θ)F (θ,Qkx),
where Qk represents input productivity in sector k, g is strictly increasing in θ and F exhibits constant
returns to scale. Variation in Q induces changes in the effective input cost and higher Q is equivalent to a
lower input price. The restriction on g implies the existence of increasing returns to skill. Importantly, the
input quantity used by each agent is endogenous and chosen to maximize profits.
Solving the assignment problem shows that, in equilibrium, a log-submodular production function im-
plies positive assortative matching between skill and sectoral input productivity. Interestingly, this result
reverses the condition on F required for positive assortative matching in comparative advantage assignment
models. The switch is a consequence of making input quantity endogenous. The choice of x determines an
agent’s span of control. Since there are increasing returns to skill, higher skill agents leverage their abilities
by having larger spans of control. F is strictly log-submodular if and only if the elasticity of substitution
between inputs exceeds unity and this substitutability implies agents with greater spans of control produce
relatively more in sectors where the effective input cost is lower. Consequently, positive assortative match-
ing is the efficient allocation. This is an example of the scale of operations effect discussed in Sattinger
(1993). By contrast, if each agent must work with the same input quantity, substitutability mandates that
high skill agents work with low productivity inputs and log-submodularity of F implies negative assortative
matching.7
Vogel (2010) or production combines different types of labor in fixed quantities (Grossman and Maggi 2000; Grossman 2004).
7Similarly, if the production function is strictly log-supermodular the equilibrium assignment exhibits positive assortative match-
ing if input quantity is fixed and negative assortative matching if it is endogenous.
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Assignment reversals occur when the ranking of sectors by input costs or productivity varies across
countries. What could cause such variation? First, Ricardian non-labor input augmenting technology dif-
ferences at the country-sector level. For example, in France land is more productive for producing wine
than rice, while in Bangladesh the reverse is true. Similarly, countries with better contracting institutions
are likely to have higher relative productivity in sectors that use contract intensive inputs. Second, input
price variation. Due to trade costs the price of imported inputs increases with distance from the export-
ing country, which raises relative input costs in sectors that use imported inputs intensively. The evidence
in Section 2.3 is consistent with this channel affecting the equilibrium labor assignment. Since existing
multi-sector models of skill allocation assume an invariant ranking of sectors by workforce skill they do not
admit the possibility of assignment reversals.8 In the Heckscher-Ohlin model the key assumption is that
there are no factor intensity reversals. Consequently, Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity reversals could explain
observed assignment reversals. However, skill intensity reversals result from cross-country variation in the
skill premium and in Section 2.2 I find no evidence the assignment reversals evident in Figure 1 are driven
by differences in the skill premium.
The equilibrium assignment also has interesting implications for the distribution of wages:
1. Labor’s share of output is decreasing in worker skill and, therefore, in wages – a correlation that is
observed empirically.
2. Holding skill constant, the returns to skill (the elasticity of wages with respect to skill) are higher in
sectors with greater input productivity or lower input cost. Consistent with this prediction Gibbons et al.
(2005) estimate the returns to skill are greater in occupations that employ higher skill workers.
Moreover, the span of control is a sufficient statistic for both wage inequality and labor’s share of output.
Scale and skill are complements and whenever agents’ spans of control increase wage inequality rises and
labor’s output share falls. Consequently, it is straightforward to use the model to study the causes of variation
in wage inequality.
Section 4 embeds the assignment problem in general equilibrium in a two sector closed economy and
Section 5 introduces trade between two countries. The fact the wage rank correlation in Figure 1 is strongly
increasing in income per capita implies assignment reversals are rare between developed countries, but
relatively common when comparing developed and developing countries. Therefore, in the open economy I
8An exception is Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) who discuss the possibility of cross-country assignment reversals in the
allocation of talent between rent seeking and entrepreneurial activities.
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consider two cases: North-North trade where the ranking of sectors by input productivity and, consequently,
workforce skill is the same in both countries, and; North-South trade where there is an assignment reversal
across countries. North-North trade leads to a Stolper-Samuelson effect – trade raises wage inequality
between high and low skill workers in the country that has a comparative advantage in the high skill sector
and reduces wage inequality between high and low skill workers in the other country.
However, in the North-South case with an assignment reversal I find that: (i) both countries have a
comparative advantage in their high skill, high wage sector regardless of their relative factor endowments;
(ii) trade liberalization causes the high skill sector to expand in both countries and both countries export the
output of their high skill sector, and; (iii) in both countries trade liberalization causes wage levels and wage
inequality to increase in the high skill sector and decrease in the low skill sector implying both countries
experience wage polarization and increased inequality between high and low skill workers. Therefore,
assignment reversals offer a new explanation for why trade liberalization has led to increased wage inequality
not only in the relatively skill abundant North, but also in the relatively skill scarce South.
Unlike alternative mechanisms through which trade has been linked to increases in wage inequality,
the assignment reversals channel cannot co-exist with Stolper-Samuelson effects since assignment reversals
imply the ranking of sectors by workforce skill differs across countries which overturns the logic behind the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Since the inter-industry trade share and skill endowment differences are greater
between less similar countries, in the absence of assignment reversals Stolper-Samuelson effects should be
most important in North-South trade. An important consequence of North-South assignment reversals is that
they explain why Stolper-Samuelson effects may not occur even as a consequence of inter-industry output
trade between North and South.
I also use the assignment model to study the effects of technical change and trade in the non-labor input.
Technical change increases the returns to skill whenever it reduces the effective input cost allowing agents
to increase their spans of control. Input trade liberalization allows importers to purchase the non-labor input
at lower cost. Thus, it is equivalent to input cost reducing technical change and causes an increase in within
sector returns to skill and wage inequality in the importing country. This prediction is consistent with the
findings of Csillag and Koren (2009) and Parro (2013) who show that capital imports increase the relative
wage of high skill labor.
This paper demonstrates how endogenizing the sectoral skill allocation leads to a new perspective on the
determinants of the wage distribution and the effects of output trade. In related work, Grossman, Helpman
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and Kircher (2015) develop a model in which there are two heterogeneous labor types and agents both
sort across sectors and match to form production teams within sectors. However, Grossman, Helpman and
Kircher (2015) do not consider how cross-sector variation in effective input costs affects sorting and do not
allow for the production technology to vary across countries. Consequently, they do not address the causes
and consequences of assignment reversals.
2 Assignment reversals evidence
The allocation of skill across sectors can be inferred from data on industry wages and workforce character-
istics. Since, for most countries, industry wage data is available at a more disaggregated level than measures
of workforce skill, this section starts by treating an industry’s mean wage per employee as a measure of
the average skill of the industry’s workforce. Under this assumption, I demonstrate that industry wage data
implies the existence of cross-country assignment reversals which are systematically related to countries’
income levels. I then show that using available data on observable measures of workforce skill leads to
the same conclusion. Next, I consider the possibility the assignment reversals found in the data result from
Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity reversals. I find no support for this hypothesis. Finally, I provide evidence
that variation in the cost of capital equipment across countries and industries leads to assignment reversals.
2.1 International wage structure comparisons
The assumption that inter-industry wage differences primarily reflect differences in workforce skill, rather
than variation in industry specific rents is supported by the empirical literature on inter-industry wage dif-
ferences. Krueger and Summers (1986) find that observable worker characteristics alone account for around
half of inter-industry wage differences in the US. Moreover, once panel data is used to also control for un-
observable worker characteristics, the explanatory power of workforce composition rises further (Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis 1999; Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz 2002).
Studies of inter-industry wage differences have generally concluded that the pattern of industry wages
is highly correlated across countries. For example, Krueger and Summers (1986) find that in eight of the
thirteen countries they consider the correlation of log wages with the US exceeds 0.8,9 leading them to
conclude that the “wage structure is amazingly parallel in looking at data for different countries” (p.1).
9The correlations are calculated using wage data for around 20 manufacturing industries in 1981 or 1982.
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However, the consensus found in the literature has emerged primarily from comparisons between industri-
alized economies. Noting that four of the five countries with correlations below 0.8 are non-industrialized
economies Krueger and Summers (1986) caution that the wage structure in mature capitalist economies is
“different from that of Communist or less developed economies” (p.2).
Figure 1, discussed previously in the introduction, shows that this claim continues to hold when looking
at industry wage data for a broader sample of countries than considered by Krueger and Summers (1986).
Remember that Figure 1 shows wage rank correlations (the correlation between the ranking of industries by
wage levels in a given country and the ranking in the US) plotted against income per capita (expressed as
log differences from US per capita income). Regressing the wage rank correlation on the income difference
gives a significant slope coefficient of 0.13 (Table 1, column a). The positive association is robust to weight-
ing observations by industry employment shares when calculating the wage rank correlations (column b)
and to computing correlations using wages instead of wage ranks (columns c and d). An alternative ap-
proach to quantifying the similarity between a country’s inter-industry wage structure and that of the US is
to compute the proportion of industry pairs in which the ranking of industries by wage levels is the same as
in the US. Figure 2 shows that for a country such as France the proportion exceeds 80%, but for the poorest
country in the sample, Bangladesh, it is only 61%. The relationship between income per capita and the
proportion of pairwise rank matches is positive and significant (column e). Industry wage data also implies
that income convergence with the US is associated with convergence towards the US inter-industry wage
structure. Regressing the change in the wage rank correlation on the change in income per capita relative to
the US for 70 countries between 1965 and 1995 gives a significant slope of 0.12 (column f).10
If poorer countries report less reliable data, these findings could be caused by measurement error. To
allay this concern Figure 3 shows wage rank correlations plotted against income per capita using industry
wage data for 1995 taken from the EU KLEMS database. The EU KLEMS database is designed to provide
accurate industry level data for use in growth accounting exercises. The database covers 29 countries (the
EU-25 plus Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US) and, at its most disaggregated level, 29 manufacturing
industries. Again, the wage rank correlation is strongly increasing in per capita income, but the slope of the
relationship is larger than in the UNIDO data. Regressing the wage rank correlation on the income per capita
difference gives a slope of 0.26.
The results in Table 1 support Krueger and Summers’ (1986) hypothesis that while developed countries
10The wage data covers 28 ISIC 3 digit manufacturing industries. See Appendix C for further details.
8
have strikingly similar industry wage structures, this similarity does not extend to developing economies.
Under the maintained assumption that inter-industry wage differences stem from variation in workforce
skill, the cross-country variation in wage rank correlations implies that assignment reversals exist and occur
more frequently between countries at different stages of development than between countries with similar
income per capita levels.
Unfortunately, cross-country data on industry workforce skill is not available at the same level of disag-
gregation as industry wage data. However, the IPUMS-International database of individual-level censuses
does report both respondents’ industry (at approximately the 1 digit level) and their educational attainment.
From this data I calculated the share of workers in each country-industry pair who had completed secondary
school and used this measure of industry skill intensity to compute the “skill rank correlation” of each
country with the US. There is a positive association between skill rank correlations and income per capita,
although the slope of 0.018 is smaller than for the wage rank correlations considered above (Table 2, col-
umn a). A stronger positive association is found if tertiary education completion shares are used (column
b). These results are consistent with the industry wage data, but more disaggregated workforce skill data is
needed to directly observe assignment reversals.
2.2 Skill intensity reversals?
Could the cross-country variation in wage rank correlations be caused by Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity
reversals?11 Consider a multi-sector Heckscher-Ohlin economy in which production uses two types of
labor: skilled and unskilled. In each industry the skill intensity of production will depend on the skill
premium and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, while in each country the
skill premium will depend on output prices and the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labor. If skill
intensity reversals occur, then industries in which the elasticity of substitution is relatively high will be
skilled labor intensive in countries with low skill premia and unskilled labor intensive in countries with high
skill premia. In particular, if all industries use constant elasticity of substitution production technologies
it is simple to show that the number of skill intensity reversals between any two countries is an increasing
function of the difference between their skill premia.12 Therefore, if variation in wage rank correlations
11See Minhas (1962) and Leontief (1964) for analysis of the conditions under which factor intensity reversals may occur and a
debate over their existence. The extensive literature on factor intensity reversals tends to conclude that capital intensity reversals
are of limited empirical relevance, but has largely overlooked skill intensity reversals.
12See Reshef (2007) for a theoretical analysis of the causes and consequences of skill intensity reversals in such a model.
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is caused by Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity reversals, it will be strongly correlated with variation in skill
premia.
Internationally comparable measures of the skill premium are not available for the majority of the coun-
tries in the UNIDO sample used in Figure 1. However, differences in skill premia across countries are well
explained by variation in human capital levels.13 Therefore, to crudely examine whether cross-country dif-
ferences in the inter-industry wage structure are due to Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity reversals I regress the
wage rank correlations shown in Figure 1 on countries’ stocks of physical and human capital per capita.14
There is a strong positive association between the capital stock and the wage rank correlation, but the human
capital variable is insignificant (Table 3, column a). Similar results are obtained when the secondary school
enrollment rate, which is available for a larger sample of countries, is used as a proxy for the skill premium
(column b). These findings do not support the conjecture that Heckscher-Ohlin skill intensity reversals are
driving cross-country variation in wage rank correlations.
2.3 Equipment costs and the inter-industry wage structure
To motivate the assignment model developed in Section 3, I next provide evidence that differences in non-
labor input costs can generate cross-country variation in the inter-industry wage structure resulting in assign-
ment reversals. Specifically, I show that controlling for country and industry fixed effects, the mean wage is
higher in industries where the cost of capital equipment is lower. In order to obtain a measure of the cost of
capital equipment that varies across countries and industries and is plausibly exogenous to industry wages,
I exploit the interaction between differences in the composition of equipment investment across industries
and the geographic distribution of equipment production.
Suppose capital is produced as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of I equipment varieties with expenditure
shares that vary by industry. Then the cost of capital equipment Pkc in industry k of country c is given by:
Pkc ∝
I∏
i=1
p
αki
ic (1)
where pic is the price of equipment variety i in country c and αki is the share of industry k’s capital expen-
diture allocated to equipment variety i. Note that the expenditure shares do not vary across countries and
13See, for example, Ferna`ndez, Guner and Knowles (2005) and Brambilla et al. (2012).
14The physical and human capital variables are computed using the methodology of Caselli (2005) and are expressed as the log
difference from US physical and human capital per capita, respectively. See Appendix C for details.
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the equipment variety prices do not vary across industries. I divide equipment into I = 15 varieties and use
capital expenditure data for US industries to compute the expenditure shares.15
Equipment variety prices are not available for most countries and, even if available, may be endogenous
to industry outcomes. To overcome these difficulties I make use of three empirical regularities documented
by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Caselli and Wilson (2004). First, equipment production is highly concen-
trated in a handful of countries that invest heavily in research and development. Second, equipment imports
from the major equipment producers account for over half of equipment investment in most countries.16
Third, trade costs generate variation in the cost of equipment across countries. In addition, I document be-
low that there is substantial variation in the market shares of major equipment producing countries across
equipment varieties. This implies the relative production costs of different producers varies across equip-
ment varieties. Based on these four facts, I conjecture that the price of each equipment variety is lower,
ceteris paribus, in countries that are geographically close to the major exporters of that equipment variety.
Therefore, in each country the cost of capital equipment will be relatively low in industries that use in-
tensively equipment varieties for which the country is geographically close to exporters with large export
market shares. If valid, this conjecture provides a source of variation in the cost of capital equipment that is
both measurable and exogenous to industry wage outcomes.
To implement this idea I define the major equipment exporters to be the eight largest equipment exporters
between 1995 and 2000: US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Canada, Italy and China. Each of these countries
accounted for more than 3.5% of world exports of the 15 equipment varieties between 1995 and 2000 and
collectively they accounted for 64% of equipment exports. Let the revealed advantageRAid of exporter d in
equipment variety i be d’s share of total exports of equipment variety i by the 8 major equipment exporters.
Table 4 shows summary statistics on revealed advantages in 2000. There is substantial within-exporter
variation in revealed advantage. The average coefficient of variation across the eight exporters is 64% and
each exporter has a revealed advantage below 9% in at least one equipment variety and above 16% in some
other equipment variety. I define the cost of imported equipment CIE for equipment variety i in country c
as:
15See Appendix C for a detailed description of the data used in this section.
16In fact, Caselli and Wilson (2004) argue that “for most countries, imports of capital of a certain type are an adequate proxy for
overall investment in that type of equipment” (p.2).
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CIEic =
(
8∑
d=1
RAid
GDcd
)−1
,
where GD measures the gravity-adjusted distance between country c and country d. The gravity-adjusted
distance is computed as:
GDcd = −ηˆ0 log distcd − ηˆ1 langcd − ηˆ2 bordcd − ηˆ3 colcd,
where dist denotes distance and lang, bord and col are dummy variables indicating whether countries c
and d share a common language, share a border or were ever in a colonial relationship, respectively. The
ηˆ coefficients are obtained by estimating a gravity model of equipment trade including dist, lang, bord
and col, together with importer and exporter fixed effects, as regressors.17 If geographic proximity to a
major equipment exporter lowers the relative cost of equipment varieties in which the exporter has a high
revealed advantage, then it should also increase imports of such equipment varieties. Regressing imports by
equipment variety in 2000 on the cost of imported equipment I do indeed find that imports are higher when
the cost of imported equipment is lower (Table 5, column a).
I use the cost of imported equipment CIEic as a proxy for the equipment variety price pic in (1) and
define the cost of imported capital CIC in industry k and country c as:
CICkc =
I∏
i=1
CIE
αki
ic .
Columns (b) and (c) of Table 5 show that industry level investment per worker is higher when the cost of
imported capital is lower. These results support the hypothesis that CIC captures variation in industries’
capital equipment costs.
To analyze how the cost of capital equipment affects the inter-industry wage structure I estimate the
following equation:
logωkc = γ logCICkc + φXkc + αk + δc + kc, (2)
where ω is the mean industry wage, X is a vector of controls, αk is an industry dummy and δc is a country
fixed effect. As controls I use the logarithms of industry level measures of capital, skill and contract intensity
17The estimated coefficients are: ηˆ0 = −1.21; ηˆ1 = 0.59; ηˆ2 = 0.54; ηˆ3 = 0.91.
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computed from US data interacted with the logarithms of country level measures of capital abundance,
skill abundance and the rule of law, respectively.18 The sample covers 36 countries and 127 ISIC 4 digit
industries. The eight major equipment exporters are excluded from the sample since the cost of imported
capital is endogenous in these countries.
The results of estimating (2) are shown in Table 6. The mean industry wage is higher when the cost
of imported capital is lower and this effect is observed regardless of whether the capital, skill and contract
interactions are excluded (column a) or included (column b). In order to generate assignment reversals,
variation in the cost of imported capital should affect the industry wage ranking. When the dependent
variable is an industry’s percentile rank in the wage distribution, the cost of imported capital is insignificant
if it is the only explanatory variable (column c), but remains significant when the interaction controls are
included (column d).
A concern with these results is the possibility of reverse causality. Suppose higher wage industries
use capital more intensively. The resulting demand for equipment imports could generate reverse causality
through its effect on the revealed advantages of equipment exporters. The demand effect would be strongest
between neighboring countries and when the importing country is economically large. Another issue is
measurement error. The relationship between the cost of capital equipment Pkc and the cost of imported
capital CICkc is likely to be weaker in richer countries that produce a larger share of their capital equipment
domestically, leading to measurement error that is systematically correlated with per capita income. To
mitigate these concerns I restrict the sample to countries with low income per capita. In the restricted
sample measurement error should be reduced. In addition, the estimates are less likely to be biased by
reverse causality since the low income per capita countries are on average smaller economies and also
geographically more distant from the major equipment exporters. Columns (e)–(h) of Table 6 repeat the
regressions shown in columns (a)–(d), but with the sample restricted to countries with income per capita
below the sample median. A lower cost of imported capital raises both the industry wage and the industry’s
rank in the wage distribution. The magnitude of the estimates is roughly four times larger than in columns
(a)–(d), which is consistent with the full sample estimates suffering from attenuation bias. Based on the
estimate in column (e) of Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in the log cost of imported capital
18To understand the choice of controls note, for example, that in the absence of factor price equalization the Heckscher-Ohlin
model predicts that relatively skill abundant countries will have relatively lower industry wages in relatively skill intensive indus-
tries.
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causes a 3.3% increase in the industry wage.19 Collectively, the results in Table 6 show wages are higher in
industries that have access to relatively cheap sources of imported capital. This suggests the cost of capital
equipment plays a significant role in shaping the inter-industry wage structure and generating assignment
reversals.
3 Assignment model
To understand how heterogeneous workers sort across sectors and the causes of assignment reversals this
section develops a multi-sector labor assignment model and characterizes the equilibrium assignment. Mo-
tivated by the evidence in Section 2.3, the model focuses on how non-labor input costs affect sorting.
3.1 Assignment problem
Consider an economy facing the following assignment problem. There exists an heterogeneous factor that
differs along a single dimension of heterogeneity indexed by θ. To be concrete, suppose the factor is labor
and there are a continuum of agents with differing skill levels θ. Let M(θ) be the mass of agents with skill
less than or equal to θ and suppose M has support on
(
0, θ¯
]
. Bounded support is the only restriction on the
skill distribution M required to obtain the main results of the paper.
The economy comprises K productive activities in which labor can be employed. The interpretation
of these productive activities depends on how the assignment problem is embedded in general equilibrium.
For consistency with the general equilibrium model in Section 4 I will refer to the productive activities
as sectors, but they could also be tasks or occupations. Each sector produces a different good and the
production technology varies across sectors. The assignment problem is to characterize the mapping of
agents to sectors.
Suppose in all sectors output is produced by production teams, each of which consists of one agent
working with an homogeneous non-labor input.20 In particular, let the output of a skill θ agent working with
x units of input in sector k, yk(θ, x), be given by:
yk(θ, x) = g(θ)F (θ,Qkx), (3)
19The standard deviation is calculated using the low income sample after demeaning the log cost of imported capital by country
and industry.
20The model does not speak to where the boundaries of the firm may lie, so I will refer to the basic unit of activity as a production
team.
14
where g is non-negative, differentiable and strictly increasing and F is a twice differentiable, constant returns
to scale function that is strictly increasing in both its arguments, strictly concave and satisfies limθ→0 ∂F∂θ =
limx→0 ∂F∂x =∞. Within a sector all production teams produce the same output good.
Four features of the production function are particularly noteworthy. First, the labor input to production
is indivisible. If, instead, agents with different skill levels were perfect substitutes within production teams,
θ would simply measure an agent’s efficiency units of labor and there would be no assignment problem.
Second, skill enters production symmetrically in every sector. Holding Qkx fixed, the marginal effect of
skill on output is constant across sectors. Third, g captures the existence of increasing returns to ability.
Fourth, Qk is an input augmenting productivity term which captures technology variation across sectors.
This is the only source of cross-sector heterogeneity.21 Note that Qkx can be interpreted as the quantity of
input used measured in efficiency units and 1/Qk is the cost per efficiency unit of input. Thus, the effective
input cost is decreasing in Qk. I assume sectors are ordered such that Qk is increasing in k with sector one
being the least technologically advanced and sector K the most.
Assume there is perfect competition in all markets, that all sectors must produce positive aggregate
output and that the homogeneous input is in perfectly elastic supply at cost p. Provided x is a choice
variable there is no loss of generality in assuming all sectors use the same input since allowing for variation
in input cost across sectors is equivalent to varying Qk. We can now solve the assignment problem in partial
equilibrium taking the input cost and the existence of positive aggregate demand for each sector’s output as
given. The general equilibrium model developed in Section 4 shows that the partial equilibrium assignment
patterns are robust to endogenizing input supply and explicitly specifying output demand.
Formally, the production function in (3) is similar to that used by Rosen (1982) in a single sector model of
firm hierarchies. In theory, the input could represent materials, land, capital or an homogeneous labor input.
Cross-sector technology heterogeneity may result from either sector specific input augmenting technology
investments or from sector specific differences in the input price. Following Rosen (1982) the form of
the production function can be motivated by assuming a skill θ agent supplies θ units of labor input and
produces output of quality g(θ). Qkx denotes the quantity of input used, measured in efficiency units, and
diminishing returns to x result from spreading a fixed labor input over an increasing quantity of non-labor
input. However, the fact higher skill agents produce higher quality output means there are increasing returns
21Appendix B generalizes the production function to allow for multiple sources of cross-sector heterogeneity and demonstrates
that the effect of input productivity on the equilibrium assignment is robust to this extension.
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to skill.
3.2 Equilibrium assignment
The solution to the assignment problem depends crucially on whether or not the quantity of input used x is
endogenous. Suppose for now x is endogenous. Then an agent with skill θ working in sector k chooses x to
maximize her wage wk(θ) which equals the value of output produced by her production team less the input
cost:
wk(θ) = max
x≥0
{ψkyk(θ, x)− px} ,
where ψk is the price of sector k output. Remembering F has constant returns to scale it is useful to express
the production technology in intensive form. Define f(s) = F (1, s) where s ≡ Qkxθ denotes the agent’s
span of control. The span of control measures the efficiency units of input used per unit of skill and captures
the extent to which an agent leverages her ability by working with large amounts of the input. Note that f is
strictly increasing and strictly concave. With this change of variables:
yk(θ, s) = θg(θ)f(s), (4)
and the agent’s maximization problem is:
wk(θ) = max
s≥0
{
θ
[
ψkg(θ)f(s)− p
Qk
s
]}
. (5)
The elasticity of output with respect to the span of control will play a key role in determining the
equilibrium assignment. From (4) we see that this elasticity equals the elasticity of f with respect to the
span of control f (s). I will refer to f (s) as the output elasticity. The properties of the output elasticity are
given by the following lemma. The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. The following are equivalent: (i) F is strictly log-submodular; (ii) F has elasticity of substitution
greater than one; (iii) f (s) is strictly increasing in the span of control s.
Similarly, strict log-supermodularity of F is equivalent to F having elasticity of substitution σ less than
one and to f (s) being strictly decreasing in s, while if σ = 1 then f (s) is independent of s.22 Following
22See Costinot (2009) for a definition and discussion of log-supermodularity and log-submodularity. In particular, I use the fact
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Acemoglu (2002) I will refer to labor and the homogeneous input as gross complements if σ < 1 and gross
substitutes if σ > 1. Note that σ need not be constant, but any restrictions on σ are assumed to hold globally.
Solving the maximization problem (5) implies the optimal span of control sk(θ) satisfies:
f ′ [sk(θ)] =
p
ψkQkg(θ)
. (6)
Henceforth, I will suppress the dependence of sk on θ unless its inclusion is necessary to avoid confusion.
Since f is strictly increasing and strictly concave, f ′ is positive and strictly decreasing implying that the
span of control is strictly decreasing in the effective input cost p/Qk, but strictly increasing in the output
price ψk and the agent’s skill θ. The span of control is increasing in θ only because g′ > 0, that is because
there exist increasing returns to ability. Substituting (6) back into (5) implies the sector k wage function
wk(θ) is given by:
wk(θ) = ψkθg(θ)
[
f(sk)− skf ′(sk)
]
. (7)
The above analysis solves the agent’s optimization problem conditional on her sector of employment, but
how do agents sort across sectors? In equilibrium each agent chooses to work in the sector k that maximizes
her wage:
w(θ) = max
k=1,...,K
{wk(θ)} .
Agents choose sectors taking output prices as given, but since all sectors produce positive aggregate output
by assumption, output prices must be such that a positive mass of agents sorts into every sector.
Consider an agent choosing between two sectors k and l with Qk > Ql. To ensure wages in sector
k are not strictly higher than wages in sector l at all skill levels we must have ψk < ψl.23 The intuition
is straightforward – if sector k has both a better technology and a higher output price than sector l then
all agents will prefer to work in sector k. Similarly, to guarantee some workers prefer sector k we must
have ψkQk > ψlQl, which implies sk(θ) > sl(θ). An agent’s span of control is greater in the more
that F is strictly log-submodular if and only if ∂
2 logF
∂θ∂x
< 0. Though implicit in Sattinger (1975) and Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012), I am not aware of previous work that demonstrates explicitly the link between log-supermodularity, log-submodularity and
the elasticity of substitution of a constant returns to scale production function.
23Suppose ψk ≥ ψl. Then since Qk > Ql we have ψkQk > ψlQl. Noting that f(sk) − skf ′(sk) is strictly increasing in sk
and, therefore, in ψkQk it follows that wk(θ) > wl(θ) for all θ, which cannot occur.
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technologically advanced sector.
Now by differentiating (7) we obtain:
d
dθ
[
wk(θ)
wl(θ)
]
∝ g(θ)
[
f (sk)− f (sl)
]
, (8)
where g(θ) > 0 is the elasticity of g with respect to skill. From Lemma 1 we know that if F is strictly
log-submodular then the output elasticity is strictly increasing in the span of control. Since sk(θ) > sl(θ)
this implies the right hand side of (8) is positive meaning the wage in sector k relative to sector l is strictly
increasing in skill. Therefore, to ensure neither sector dominates the other there must exist a threshold
θ˜ ∈ (0, θ¯] such that agents with skill below θ˜ strictly prefer sector l and agents with skill above θ˜ strictly
prefer sector k. On the other hand, if F is log-supermodular the output elasticity is strictly decreasing in the
span of control and the sorting pattern is reversed.
The preceding discussion considers only two sectors. However, by comparing all pairs of sectors it is
straightforward to extend the results to encompass K sectors. The ranking of sectors by productivity Qk
fully determines the ranking of output prices ψk and of ψkQk. With QK > QK−1 > . . . > Q1, then in any
equilibrium such that all sectors produce positive aggregate output:
(i) ψ1 > ψ2 > . . . > ψK ;
(ii) ψ1Q1 < ψ2Q2 < . . . < ψKQK .
These orderings hold regardless of whether or not F is log-submodular. However, when F is strictly log-
submodular we also have:
(iii) ∃ 0 = θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θK−1 ≤ θK = θ¯ such that only agents with skill θ ∈ [θk−1, θk] are employed
in sector k.24
This means that in equilibrium agents are partitioned by skill and there is positive assortative matching of
higher skill agents into more technologically advanced sectors. If F is strictly log-supermodular the sorting
pattern is reversed and there is negative assortative matching. Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium
assignment of agents to sectors when the quantity of input used is endogenous.
Proposition 1. (Endogenous input quantity.) If the production function is strictly log-submodular then the
equilibrium assignment of agents to sectors exhibits positive assortative matching. High skill agents are
assigned to sectors with high levels of technology. If the production function is strictly log-supermodular
24The inequalities in (iii) will be strict if there are no mass points in the distribution of θ.
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then in equilibrium there is negative assortative matching.
Proposition 1 shows that sorting is driven by cross-sector differences in the effective cost of non-labor
inputs. This motivation for sorting is not found in the existing assignment literature which only allows
for a single factor of production. I explore below the implications of this result, but one consequence
is immediately apparent. Assignment reversals occur when the ranking of sectors by input productivity
or, equivalently, effective input cost differs across countries. The importance of assignment reversals for
understanding the effects of international trade on wage inequality are discussed in Section 5.
Why does a log-submodular production function lead to positive assortative matching? When F is log-
submodular labor and non-labor inputs are gross substitutes. This substitutability means the output elasticity
is increasing in the span of control. Since the span of control is increasing in both θ and Qk, the highest
skill agents sort into the sector with the best technology in order to maximize their leverage by using the
input with the lowest effective cost. This is an example of a scale of operations effect (Sattinger 1993).
However, if F is log-supermodular having a greater span of control reduces the output elasticity because the
complementarity between factors diminishes the value of working with large quantities of input when the
labor input is fixed. Consequently, higher skill agents reduce their spans of control by working in sectors
with lower Qk.
When the elasticity of substitution between labor and the non-labor input equals one, the wage function
is the same in all sectors and there is no sorting. From (8) we also see that g′ > 0 is necessary for Proposition
1 to hold. If g′ = 0 (implying constant returns to ability) span of control is independent of skill by (6) and,
in equilibrium, all agents are indifferent between sectors and there is no sorting.
It is useful to compare Proposition 1 with the predictions of the comparative advantage assignment lit-
erature (Sattinger 1975; Ohnsorge and Trefler 2007; Costinot 2009; Costinot and Vogel 2009; Acemoglu
and Autor 2011). In this literature there is a single heterogeneous factor of production, the production func-
tion is Ricardian and a log-supermodular production function leads to positive assortative matching between
the heterogeneous factor and sectors. For example, if the factor is labor then log-supermodularity of labor
productivity in skill and some variable that indexes sectors implies that in equilibrium more skilled labor is
assigned to sectors where the marginal effect of skill on labor productivity is greater. By contrast, Proposi-
tion 1 implies that log-submodularity of the production function implies positive assortative matching. To
reconcile this apparent contradiction we must interpret the production function used in comparative advan-
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tage assignment models as a reduced form representation of the revenue function net of all non-labor input
costs. This net revenue function is equivalent to the wage functionwk(θ) discussed above and differentiation
of (7) shows that the wage is log-supermodular in θ andQk if and only if output is log-submodular and there
are increasing returns to ability. An important contribution of this paper is to show how the properties of
the net revenue function used in previous assignment models are related to the properties of the underlying
production technology when there are two factors of production.25
The key assumption under which log-submodularity implies positive assortative matching is not the
existence of an homogeneous input, but that the input level x is endogenously chosen. Suppose instead
each agent must work with a fixed input quantity x˜. In this case each agent works in the sector where
she generates the greatest revenue, exactly as happens in the comparative advantage assignment literature.
Wages are given by:
wk(θ) = ψkg(θ)F (θ,Qkx˜)− px˜,
and comparing sectors k and l with Qk > Ql we have that when wk(θ) = wl(θ):
d
dθ
[
wk(θ)
wl(θ)
]
∝ f (sl)− f (sk), (9)
which is negative if F is strictly log-submodular and positive if F is strictly log-supermodular by Lemma
1. Therefore, when the input quantity is exogenously fixed the equilibrium assignment is reversed and a
log-submodular production function implies negative assortative matching.
Proposition 2. (Exogenous input quantity.) If the production function is strictly log-submodular then the
equilibrium assignment exhibits negative assortative matching between skill and input productivity. If the
production function is strictly log-supermodular then in equilibrium there is positive assortative matching.
To understand why fixing x reverses the sorting pattern remember that when F is log-submodular the
inputs are gross substitutes. If input quantity is fixed, efficiency requires matching high skill agents with low
technology sectors to take advantage of this substitutability. By contrast, if input choice is endogenous high
skill agents leverage their ability by using more of the input. When there are increasing returns to skill and
25Note that when production uses non-labor inputs a distinction must be made between the primitive production function given
in (3) and the equilibrium output function yk(θ,Qk) = θg(θ)f [sk(θ)] which gives output conditional on the optimal input choice.
When F is log-submodular, the equilibrium output function can be either log-submodular or log-supermodular. However, the wage
function will always be log-supermodular, which ensures positive assortative matching.
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the inputs are gross substitutes, the leveraging effect is sufficiently strong that the equilibrium assignment
features positive assortative matching.
The switch between positive and negative assortative matching triggered by allowing for input adjusta-
bility has potentially interesting implications for how institutional development affects the labor market. For
example, consider an economy with a log-submodular production function. Suppose initially financial insti-
tutions are under-developed and borrowing constraints force all agents to work with a fixed input quantity.
Under these circumstances high skill agents will work in low technology sectors. However, if credit markets
develop to the point where agents can pledge some fraction of their income as collateral then more skilled
agents will be able to work with greater quantities of input, sorting will reverse and financial development
will precipitate dramatic changes in the labor market and the distribution of income.
Since in observed production technologies non-labor input quantity is usually adjustable, I assume x is
endogenous for the remainder of this paper. Motivated by the evidence in Section 2.3, I also assume the
production technology is log-submodular to ensure that industries with a lower effective input cost employ
more skilled workers and pay higher wages. Formally, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) The production function is strictly log-submodular in labor skill θ and input quantity x.
(ii) Input quantity x is a choice variable.
3.3 Wage distribution
The equilibrium assignment has two important implications for the wage structure. First, from (4) and (7),
labor’s share of output is given by:
wk(θ)
ψkyk(θ)
= 1− f (sk). (10)
Span of control is increasing in skill and under Assumption 1 the output elasticity is increasing in the span of
control. It follows that labor’s share of output is decreasing in skill, or equivalently wages, both within and
across sectors. Moreover, input expenditure equals ψkθg(θ)f(sk)f (sk) which is increasing in θ, implying
input expenditure per worker is increasing in wages and decreasing in labor’s share of output both within
and across sectors. Proposition 3 summarizes these results.
Proposition 3. Both across sectors and across production teams within sectors: (i) labor’s share of output
is strictly decreasing in skill and wages, and; (ii) input expenditure per worker is strictly increasing in skill
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and wages.
By contrast, if input quantity is fixed labor’s share of output is increasing in θ within and across sectors.
While if input quantity is endogenous and the production function is log-supermodular labor’s share of
output is increasing in skill within sectors, but has discontinuous downward jumps at the thresholds for
sector assignment, meaning the cross-sector correlation is in general ambiguous.26 This shows that when
there are multiple factors of production, the pattern of intra-sectoral variation in income shares can be used
to infer properties of the production technology. For example, regressing the log of labor’s share of value-
added on log wages and industry fixed effects using Colombian manufacturing plant data from 1985 gives a
slope of −0.18 which is significant at the 1% level.27 This correlation is consistent with Proposition 3, but
not with the existence of a log-supermodular production function.
The second important property of the equilibrium assignment comes from differentiating (7) to obtain
the returns to skill:
wk(θ) = 1 +
g(θ)
1− f (sk) , (11)
where wk(θ) ≡ θw′k(θ)wk(θ) . Equation (11) implies that, holding θ constant, the span of control is a sufficient
statistic for the returns to skill. Moreover, under Assumption 1 the output elasticity is increasing in sk,
meaning a higher span of control raises the returns to skill. Since the span of control is increasing in ψkQk,
it follows that the returns to skill are strictly increasing in ψkQk. Intuitively, when labor and the non-
labor input are gross substitutes, high skill agents are better able than low skill agents to take advantage
of positive technology or output price shocks to increase production levels by working with greater input
quantities. Across sectors, ψkQk > ψlQl if and only if Qk > Ql implying the returns to skill are higher
in more technologically advanced sectors. Consistent with this prediction Gibbons et al. (2005) find that
returns to skill are higher in more skilled occupations.
The wage distribution depends on both the wage functionw(θ) and the distribution of skill across agents.
The model places no restrictions on the shape of the skill distribution, but equation (11), in combination with
Lemma 2 below, allows us to characterize how shocks, such as technical change and trade liberalization,
26Part (ii) of Proposition 3 is unchanged if the production function is log-supermodular.
27The data is from Roberts and Tybout (1996). The estimate controls for 4 digit ISIC industry fixed effects. Plant wages are
calculated as the sum of salaries and benefits divided by total employment and are instrumented by their two year lag to correct for
measurement error. Standard errors are clustered by 4 digit industry. The estimated wage coefficient is negative and significant for
every available year (1979-91) when either labor’s share of value-added or labor’s share of output is used as the dependent variable.
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affect wage inequality when the skill distribution is held constant.
Lemma 2. Let w(θ) and w˜(θ) be wage functions such that w(θ) > w˜(θ)∀ θ ∈ (θa, θb) ⊆
(
0, θ¯
]
. Then
wage inequality among any subset of agents with skill levels in [θa, θb] is higher underw(θ) than under w˜(θ)
for any measure of inequality that respects scale independence and second-order stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2 tells us that within-group wage inequality rises whenever both the returns to skill increase at all
skill levels and membership of the group is unchanged. Adapting an approach used by Helpman, Itskhoki
and Redding (2010) the proof of Lemma 2 shows that, after a change in means, the wage distribution implied
by w˜(θ) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution implied by w(θ). Combining Lemma 2 with
equation (11) implies that the sign of the change in wage inequality within any group of agents is fully
determined by variation in the span of control. This result will be used repeatedly below to characterize how
wage inequality is affected by trade.
4 General equilibrium
This section embeds the assignment model developed above in general equilibrium in a closed economy.
Section 5 then extends the general equilibrium model to allow for international trade and analyzes the
consequences of assignment reversals in an open economy.
To develop a general equilibrium version of the model I need to specify the input production technology
and the source of demand for each sector’s output. The assignment problem is sufficiently tractable to permit
multiple alternative general equilibrium settings. For example, the productive activities agents undertake
could be tasks, occupations or industries. Likewise, the input could represent land, materials, capital or
homogeneous labor. For the remainder of this paper I assume each productive activity constitutes a separate
sector and there exists an aggregate output good that can be used either for consumption or to produce
the homogeneous input. These assumptions are chosen primarily for their simplicity, allowing the paper
to focus on identifying the new insights that arise from the assignment model. However, in Appendix B I
show that the main results continue to hold in a more complex model where agents are assigned to tasks and
task outputs are used as factor inputs in a Heckscher-Ohlin model. This alternative set-up gives a version
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model in which the ranking of industries by workforce skill is endogenous to the
distribution of input productivity across tasks.
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4.1 Assumptions
Suppose there are two sectors, K = 2, with Q2 > Q1 and assume the skill distribution has continuous
support on
(
0, θ¯
]
and no mass points.28 Output from the two sectors is combined to produce a final good
using a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Z =
(
Y1
β
)β ( Y2
1− β
)1−β
, β ∈ (0, 1), (12)
where Z is final good output and Yk is aggregate output of sector k:
Yk =
∫ θk
θk−1
θg(θ)f(sk)dM(θ). (13)
This technology guarantees all sectors must produce positive aggregate output. The final good can be used
either for consumption or to produce the homogeneous input. Each unit of final output can be transformed
into γ units of the homogeneous input. This completes the specification of the economy. The use of a Cobb-
Douglas final good production technology simplifies solving the model, but all the closed and open economy
results obtained below continue to hold if the final good is produced using a general constant returns to scale
technology. See Appendix B for details.
4.2 Equilibrium
Given Assumption 1 we know there is positive assortative matching between agents and sectors. Therefore,
there exists a skill threshold θ1 such that agents with skill below θ1 work in sector one and agents with skill
above θ1 work in sector two.
To solve the model it is convenient to let the final good be the numeraire. This immediately implies
p = 1γ and that the effective input cost in sector k is
1
Qkγ
. From (12) the final good producers’ unit cost
minimization problem is:
min
Y1≥0,Y2≥0
{ψ1Y1 + ψ2Y2} subject to
(
Y1
β
)β ( Y2
1− β
)1−β
= 1,
and solving this problem implies:
28This assumption is for ease of exposition. It is straightforward to solve the model when the skill distribution is discrete, but the
notation is more cumbersome due to the necessity of keeping track of where agents work when they are indifferent between sectors.
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1 = ψβ1ψ
1−β
2 . (14)
Since Q2 > Q1 ⇒ ψ2 < ψ1 we must have ψ2 < 1 < ψ1. In addition, (14) implies dψ1dψ2 < 0. If the price
of sector two output rises, then the price of sector one output falls. Cost minimization and (12) also give the
market clearing equations:
βZ = ψ1Y1, (1− β)Z = ψ2Y2. (15)
Equations (6), (7), (13), (14) and (15) are sufficient to reduce the equilibrium to a system of two equa-
tions in the two unknowns, θ1 and ψ2. First, the wage equalization (WE) condition requires that an agent
with ability θ1 be indifferent between the two sectors. From (7) and (14) this implies:
f [s1(θ1)]− s1(θ1)f ′ [s1(θ1)] = ψ
1
β
2
(
f [s2(θ1)]− s2(θ1)f ′ [s2(θ1)]
)
. (WE)
Second, the output markets must clear. Using (13), (14) and (15) gives the market clearing (MC) condition:
∫ θ1
0
θg(θ)f(s1)dM(θ) =
β
1− βψ
1
β
2
∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ). (MC)
In both equilibrium conditions s1 and s2 are defined by (6) and depend implicitly on ψ2.
Figure 4 shows the (WE) and (MC) conditions in θ1-ψ2 space. The (WE) curve is downward sloping
because an increase in ψ2 makes sector two more profitable and, since
w2(θ)
w1(θ)
is increasing in θ, this decreases
the skill level at which agents are indifferent between sectors. The (MC) curve is upward sloping because
a higher ψ2 reduces the relative demand for sector two output, which necessitates the reallocation of labor
to sector one. Together the two conditions define a unique equilibrium – see the proof of Proposition 4 for
details.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique closed economy equilibrium with a threshold skill θ1 such that agents
with skill above θ1 work in the high technology sector and agents with skill below θ1 work in the low
technology sector.
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4.3 Technical change
How does input augmenting productivity growth affect the closed economy equilibrium? The most dramatic
effect occurs when technical change switches the ranking of sectors by input productivity. For example, an
increase in input productivity in sector one from Q1 < Q2 to Q′1 > Q2 precipitates an assignment reversal
making sector one the high skill, high wage sector.
However, regardless of whether technological progress changes the sector technology ranking the equi-
librium conditions imply:29
d [ψkQk]
dQj
> 0,
dψj
dQj
< 0,
dψl
dQj
> 0, j, k, l = 1, 2, l 6= j. (16)
Unsurprisingly, productivity growth in a sector leads to a price decline in that sector and a price rise in the
other sector. More importantly, productivity growth in either sector always increases ψkQk in both sectors.
Remembering equations (6) and (11) this implies the span of control sk(θ) and returns to skill wk(θ) rise
in both sectors. Appealing to Lemma 2, the higher returns to skill increase within-group wage inequality
among any group of agents who all work in the same sector and who do not switch sectors following the
technology shock. Input augmenting productivity growth raises the returns to skill in both sectors because
it causes all agents to increase their spans of control, which disproportionately benefits high skill agents for
whom the elasticity of output with respect to the span of control is greater.
Technical change can also take the form of an increase in the productivity γ of input production. From
(6) we see that span of control depends on the effective input cost 1Qkγ , meaning that an increase in γ is
equivalent to equiproportional increases in both Q1 and Q2. Therefore, we have:
d [ψkγ]
dγ
> 0, k = 1, 2,
implying that when γ increases the returns to skill rise in both sectors. Proposition 5 summarizes the effects
of technical change.
Proposition 5. Technical change that reduces the effective non-labor input cost in either sector raises the
returns to skill in both sectors. Consequently, wage inequality increases within any group of agents who all
work in the same sector and who do not switch sectors.
29See the proof of Proposition 5 for details.
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Proposition 5 shows that in the assignment model technical change is skill-biased when it is either input
augmenting or reduces the input cost. However, it’s worth noting that such technical change is complemen-
tary to skill in two distinct senses. First, any sector which experiences a sufficiently large positive technology
shock becomes the high skill sector, regardless of the skill level of its workers prior to the shock. Second,
technical change increases the returns to skill within both sectors. This prediction is consistent with evidence
that skill-biased technical change contributed to the increased inequality that was observed throughout the
US wage distribution during the 1980s (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006). Since technical changes raises
agents’ spans of control, equation (10) implies that it also reduces labor’s share of output. Labor’s share
of output in the US has declined over the past twenty-five years, but there is not yet a consensus about the
causes of this decline (Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin 2013).
Without placing restrictions on the shape of the skill distribution, or the functional form of the production
technology, the effect of technical change on the skill threshold θ1 and on inequality within groups that
include agents who are induced to switch sectors by the technological shock is, in general, ambiguous.
In particular, at skill levels such that agents switch from the high skill to the low skill sector following
a technology shock the returns to skill can decrease. However, I show in the proof of Proposition 5 that
whenever technical change causes the high skill sector to expand on the extensive margin (dθ1 < 0) wage
inequality increases within all subgroups of the population.
5 Open economy
Let us now extend the model to include two countries: home and foreign. I will use an asterisk to denote
foreign variables. I assume the two countries are identical along all dimensions except: (i) the cost per
efficiency unit of input; (ii) the skill distribution, and; (iii) population size. By Assumption 1 the production
function F is log-submodular in both countries. The aim of this section is to understand the consequences
of international trade when effective input costs differ across both sectors and countries.
The effective input cost depends on both input augmenting productivity Qk and the productivity of
input production γ. Variation in effective input costs across countries and sectors result from differences
in country-sector specific knowledge stocks and technical capabilities and from cross-country differences
in input costs. Figure 1 and Section 2.1 showed that assignment reversals occur more frequently between
developed Northern countries and developing Southern countries than between two Northern countries. In
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this section I consider two cases: North-South trade with an assignment reversal, and; North-North trade
without an assignment reversal.
In an open economy both sectoral outputs and the homogeneous input may be traded. To separate the
effects of output and input trade I will start by analyzing output trade assuming the input is non-tradable
and then proceed to allow input trade. Assuming each sector’s output is freely traded implies sectoral output
prices are equalized across countries meaning that, in the open economy, industries are defined by the output
good they produce rather than by any labeling based on industries’ input productivity levels. The final good
price is also equalized across countries and, as above, I let the final good be the numeraire. I also assume
each country’s skill distribution has continuous bounded support, but I allow the functional form and upper
bound of the skill distribution to differ across countries. When comparing the closed and open economy
equilibria I will use a tilde to denote autarky outcomes.
5.1 Assignment reversals
Let us start by considering the North-South case where there is an assignment reversal across countries and
the homogeneous input is non-traded. In particular, suppose home has higher productivity in sector two,
Q1 < Q2, but foreign has higher productivity in sector one, Q∗1 > Q∗2. This means in autarky sector two
is the high skill, high wage sector at home, while sector one is the high skill, high wage sector abroad. In
addition, diversified production requires ψ˜2 < 1 < ψ˜1 and ψ˜∗1 < 1 < ψ˜∗2 meaning:
ψ˜2
ψ˜1
< 1 <
ψ˜∗2
ψ˜∗1
,
which implies home has a comparative advantage in sector two and foreign has a comparative advantage
in sector one. Therefore, when the ranking of sectors by input productivity differs across countries, each
country has a comparative advantage in its high productivity sector, which is also its high skill, high wage
sector.
We know from Section 3 that if ψ2 ≥ ψ1 in the open economy equilibrium then in the home country
sector two offers a strictly higher wage than sector one at all skill levels. Similarly, if ψ2 ≤ ψ1 then sector
one is strictly preferred to sector two by all foreign agents. Since free trade equalizes output prices across
countries it follows that in the open economy at least one of the countries must specialize in its high skill
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sector. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that ψ2 ≤ ψ1.30 Then foreign specializes in sector one and
equation (14) implies ψ2 ≤ 1 ≤ ψ1.
In the open economy output prices must satisfy (14) and equilibrium spans of control and wages are
given by (6), (7) and their foreign equivalents. As in the closed economy, the open economy equilibrium
reduces to a system of two equations in two unknowns, θ1 and ψ2. The wage equalization (WE) condition,
which determines the skill threshold above which home agents select into sector two, is unchanged from the
closed economy case. The difference is that output markets clear at the global, not the national, level. From
(15) and its foreign equivalent global output market clearing requires:
Y1 + Y
∗
1 =
β
1− βψ
1
β
2 (Y2 + Y
∗
2 ),
and using (13), (14) and that foreign is specialized in sector one we obtain the open economy market clearing
(MC′) condition:
∫ θ1
0
θg(θ)f(s1)dM(θ) +
∫ θ¯∗
0
θg(θ)f(s∗1)dM
∗(θ) =
β
1− βψ
1
β
2
∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ). (MC′)
The only difference from the closed economy market clearing condition is the second term on the left
hand side of (MC′), which represents foreign’s sector one output. As in the closed economy, the (WE)
curve is downward sloping and the (MC′) curve is upward sloping in θ1–ψ2 space and together they define a
unique equilibrium. However, foreign production shifts the (MC′) curve upwards relative to the (MC) curve
in the closed economy (see Figure 5). Therefore, globalization reduces the skill threshold above which home
agents work in sector two, θ1 < θ˜1 and increases the home price of sector two output, ψ2 > ψ˜2.
For ψ2 ≤ 1 ≤ ψ1 to be the equilibrium outcome we must have that when ψ1 = ψ2 = 1, which
implies both countries are specialized in their high productivity sector, there is an excess supply of good
two. Consequently, a necessary and sufficient condition for output prices to satisfy ψ2 ≤ 1 ≤ ψ1 in
equilibrium is:
∫ θ¯∗
0
θg(θ)f(s∗1)dM
∗(θ) ≤ β
1− β
∫ θ¯
0
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ), (17)
30Equation (17) below gives a necessary and sufficient condition for this to be the equilibrium outcome.
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where the spans of control are defined by (6) with ψ1 = ψ2 = 1. This condition tells us that if foreign
is economically “small” relative to home then in the open economy equilibrium foreign specializes in its
high productivity sector. In this context, an economy’s size depends on how much output it can produce
in its high productivity sector and smallness can result from having a relatively low population, relatively
unskilled agents or relatively low input productivity in the high technology sector. Proposition 6 summarizes
the structure of production in the open economy equilibrium.
Proposition 6. When there is an assignment reversal across countries there exists a unique open economy
equilibrium such that: (i) each country exports the output of its high skill sector; (ii) the smaller economy
specializes in its high skill sector, and; (iii) compared to autarky the skill threshold above which agents
select into the high skill sector is lower in both countries.
Since each country has a comparative advantage in its high technology sector and high skill agents are
matched to the high technology sector, the model predicts the export sector is the high skill sector in both
countries. This prediction is absent from models that do not include assignment reversals.31 Brambilla et al.
(2012) use data from sixteen Latin American countries to estimate skill premiums at the country-industry
level. They find that the skill premium is higher in industries with a greater exports to output ratio which
implies there is an incentive for more skilled workers to sort into export industries.
Comparing the open economy equilibrium to autarky we have ψ˜2 < ψ2 < ψ˜∗2 and ψ˜∗1 < ψ1 < ψ˜1.
Therefore, following trade integration each country experiences an increase in the price of its high skill
sector and a decrease in the price of its low skill sector. From (6) and (7), these price changes increase the
wages of agents in the high skill sector and decrease the wages of agents in the low skill sector. Whether
agents who switch into the high skill sector following globalization obtain a higher wage than in autarky
is ambiguous, but in each country there exists a skill threshold such that, following trade liberalization,
the wage of all agents with skill below the threshold falls and the wage of all agents with skill above the
threshold rises.32 Thus, trade liberalization benefits high skill labor in both countries.
From equation (11) and Lemma 2 the price changes triggered by globalization increase the returns to
skill in the high skill sector and decrease the returns to skill in the low skill sector. Consequently, in both
countries, moving from autarky to free trade increases wage inequality within any group of agents em-
31Matsuyama (2007) presents a model in which export sectors are always more skill intensive than import sectors because, by
assumption, export production uses a more skill intensive technology than production for domestic consumption.
32See the proof of Proposition 7 for details.
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ployed in the high skill sector following trade liberalization and decreases wage inequality within any group
of agents employed in the low skill sector following trade liberalization. Since the smaller economy spe-
cializes in its high skill sector it experiences a pervasive rise in wage inequality – wage inequality increases
within any subset of the population containing at least two agents with different skill levels. In addition,
if equation (17) holds with equality, meaning the two economies are the same size, then both countries are
fully specialized in the open economy equilibrium and trade integration causes a pervasive increase in wage
inequality in both countries. Proposition 7 summarizes the effects of output trade on wages.
Proposition 7. When there is an assignment reversal across countries moving from autarky to free trade
causes each country to experience an increase in the price of its high skill good and a decrease in the price
of its low skill good. Consequently, in both countries, wage levels and wage inequality increase in the high
skill sector and decrease in the low skill sector.
Contrary to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Proposition 7 predicts that when there is an assignment
reversal trade raises wage inequality both in the North and in the South. This prediction is supported by
the experience of many developing countries that undertook trade liberalizations in the 1980s and 1990s.33
Mechanisms that have been invoked to explain how trade integration can raise inequality in both developed
and developing countries include offshoring (Feenstra and Hanson 1996), trade induced intra-industry input
quality upgrading (Verhoogen 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen 2012), trade in capital (Csillag and Koren 2009;
Parro 2013; Burstein, Cravino and Vogel 2013), higher skill intensity of export production (Matsuyama
2007) and intra-industry selection of high skill or high wage firms into exporting (Manasse and Turrini 2001;
Yeaple 2005; Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2010; Monte 2011; Sampson 2014). All these mechanisms
could co-exist with Stolper-Samuelson effects. In contrast, assignment reversals explain not only why trade
raises wage inequality in both North and South, but also why Stolper-Samuelson effects are not observed.34
In the absence of assignment reversals, the relevance of the Stolper-Samuelson prediction for understanding
the effects of trade on wage inequality should be greatest when considering inter-industry output trade
between dissimilar countries with very different relative endowments of skilled labor. Importantly, the
evidence in Section 2.1 shows it is in exactly these circumstances that there is most likely to be an assignment
33See, for example, Hanson and Harrison (1999) on Mexico, Han, Liu and Zhang (2012) on China and Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007) for a summary of the empirical literature. Not all developing countries have experienced increases in wage inequality
following trade liberalization. Gonzaga, Menzes-Filho and Terra (2006) find that Brazil’s 1990s trade liberalization reduced the
skill premium in a manner consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
34Working within the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Davis (1996) argues that the existence of multiple cones of diversification can
overturn the Stolper-Samuelson prediction for some countries.
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reversal between countries.
5.2 No assignment reversals
Now consider trade between two Northern countries where the ranking of sectors by effective input costs
is the same in both countries, meaning there are no assignment reversals. Assume in both countries input
productivity is higher in sector two than in sector one. In this case, the pattern of comparative advantage
across countries will depend on the effective input costs and skill distributions of the two countries according
to the autarky equilibrium conditions (WE) and (MC) and their foreign equivalents. The autarky price of
sector two output is lower, ceteris paribus, in the country with: (i) higher relative productivity in sector
two; (ii) lower absolute costs per efficiency unit of input, or; (iii) a greater proportion of high skill agents.
Without loss of generality, assume ψ˜2 < ψ˜∗2 , meaning home has a comparative advantage in sector two,
while foreign has a comparative advantage in sector one. Therefore, in the open economy equilibrium home
exports output from its high skill sector, while foreign exports output from its low skill sector.
Since the ordering of sectors by workforce skill is invariant across countries, trade-induced price changes
cannot increase the price of the high skill good in both countries. Only the country with a comparative
advantage in the high skill sector experiences an increase in the price of its high skill output. Open economy
market clearing requires ψ˜2 < ψ2 < ψ˜∗2 and from (14) this also implies ψ˜∗1 < ψ1 < ψ˜1. At home
trade liberalization has similar effects to those experienced by both countries when there is an assignment
reversal: the high skill sector expands on the extensive margin and the price changes benefit high skill labor.
However, in foreign the price of high skill output declines, the price of low skill output increases and the
low skill sector expands on the extensive margin. Consequently, trade liberalization benefits low skill labor
– there exists a threshold such that the wage of all foreign agents with skill below the threshold is higher in
the open economy than in autarky and the wage of all foreign agents with skill above the threshold is lower.
Moreover, the returns to skill increase in the low skill sector and decrease in the high skill sector, meaning
that trade liberalization increases wage inequality within any group of foreign agents employed in the low
skill sector in autarky and decreases wage inequality within any group of foreign agents employed in the
high skill sector following integration.
Proposition 8. When the ranking of sectors by input productivity is the same in both countries there exists
a unique open economy equilibrium such that: (i) one country exports its high skill, high productivity good
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and the other country exports its low skill, low productivity good, and; (ii) in both countries moving from
autarky to free trade increases wage levels and wage inequality in the export sector and decreases wage
levels and wage inequality in the import sector.
Proposition 8 shows that in the absence of assignment reversals the effects of output trade integration
on wage inequality between high and low skill agents are the same as those predicted by the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. Inequality increases in the country which has a comparative advantage in the high skill good
and decreases in the other country. However, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in the assignment
model trade also affects within-group wage inequality. In particular, Propositions 7 and 8 show that in the
assignment model trade liberalization increases returns to skill in the export sector and decreases returns
to skill in the import sector of both countries, regardless of patterns of input productivity or comparative
advantage.
Propositions 7 and 8 show that regardless of whether there is an assignment reversal across countries,
trade moves wage levels and wage inequality in the same direction in both sectors of both countries.35
Suppose the US has a comparative advantage in its high technology, high skill sector.36 Then the assignment
model predicts trade liberalization raises the level and inequality of wages in the high skill sector in the US
and lowers the level and inequality of wages in the low skill sector. This is consistent with observed wage
polarization in the US where, during the 1990s and 2000s, wage levels and inequality have increased rapidly
in the upper half of the wage distribution, while both the level and inequality of wages have risen less quickly
or perhaps declined in the lower half of the distribution (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006).
It is also interesting to note the similarities between the assignment model and a specific factors trade
model. For infra-marginal workers who do not switch sectors following trade liberalization, trade benefits
workers in the export-oriented sector and hurts workers in the import-competing sector – exactly as predicted
by a specific factors model with sector-specific labor. However, because workers are heterogeneous and the
equilibrium assignment is endogenous, the assignment model can also address questions that lie outside the
specific factors framework, such as how workers sort across sectors, which workers switch sectors following
a shock and what determines within-sector wage inequality.
35Equations (6), (7) and (11) imply that following an output price change the wage level and returns to skill in any sector must
move in the same direction. Alternative shocks, such as technical change, do not necessarily generate this comovement.
36Consistent with this assumption, Romalis (2004) provides evidence that relatively skill abundant countries, such as the US,
have a comparative advantage in relatively skill intensive sectors where sectoral skill intensity is measured using US data.
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5.3 Input trade
Finally, let us consider the effects of input trade. In the absence of trade the input price is 1γ at home and
1
γ∗
in the foreign country. Without loss of generality, assume foreign has higher productivity in input production
than home implying γ∗ > γ. Then home will import the input from foreign and moving from an equilibrium
in which the input is non-tradable to free input trade is equivalent to increasing home’s productivity in the
input production sector from γ to γ∗.
An increase in γ reduces the effective input cost in both sectors by raising γψk, k = 1, 2. Consequently,
spans of control increase in both sectors and, applying equation (11) and Lemma 2, this raises the returns to
skill and wage inequality within each sector for agents whose sector of employment does not change. Thus,
liberalization of input trade increases within sector wage inequality in the country that imports the input by
allowing workers to better leverage their skills, which disproportionately benefits more skilled agents. This
result holds regardless of whether there are assignment reversals across countries and regardless of whether
sectoral outputs are traded or non-traded.37 By contrast, the effect of input trade on wages in the input
exporter depends on the how ψ2 changes, which is ambiguous at this level of generality.
Proposition 9. Input trade raises the returns to skill in both sectors in the country that imports the input.
Consequently, wage inequality increases within any group of agents who all work in the same sector and
who do not switch sectors.
Comparing Proposition 9 to Proposition 5 above shows that, for an importer, input trade has the same
effects on wage inequality as an increase in the productivity of input production. This comparison highlights
the fact that in the assignment model inputs embody cross-country technology differences and input trade is
equivalent to a technology transfer that raises the productivity of the importing country.
If the non-labor input is interpreted as capital, the model predicts that reductions in the cost of capital
imports increase within-sector returns to skill. This prediction is supported by two recent papers that esti-
mate the impact of capital imports on wages. Csillag and Koren (2009) undertake structural estimation of
a single sector model of worker assignment, similar to Sattinger (1979), using a rich matched employer-
employee-imports data set from Hungary. They find that on average imported machines are more productive
than domestic machines and are matched with higher skill workers. In addition, the returns to skill on the
median productivity imported machine are 26% higher than on the median productivity domestic machine.
37When sectoral outputs are non-traded I assume the final good is freely tradable to ensure the trade balance condition holds.
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Parro (2013) estimates the impact of capital imports on the skill premium using a calibrated version of the
Eaton and Kortum (2002) model in which production uses skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital and there
is capital-skill complementarity. The paper finds that from 1990-2007 reductions in capital trade costs and
productivity growth in capital production each increased the skill premium by around 2 percentage points
on average across countries.
For ease of exposition I have assumed throughout the paper there is a unique non-labor input, implying
the input price is constant across sectors within a country. However, it is simple to generalize the assignment
model to allow for sector specific inputs. Suppose one unit of the final good can be transformed into γk units
of the input used in sector k implying pk = 1γk is the input price in sector k. Then the effective input cost
in sector k is Qkγk and, provided the input is non-tradable, variation in γk across sectors is equivalent to
variation in Qk. For example, the equilibrium assignment is as in Proposition 1, except sectors are ranked
by Qkγk instead of Qk.
However, this equivalence breaks down when the input is tradable because while input augmenting pro-
ductivity Qk is disembodied, variation in γk is embodied in the input which can be traded across countries.
Each country-sector pair will source its input from the lowest cost supplier. In the extreme case where there
is no within-country variation in input-augmenting productivity (i.e. Qk = Ql ∀k, l), free trade in inputs
implies the ranking of sectors by effective input costs is the same in all countries. Consequently, there are no
assignment reversals. When all cross-sector technology differences are embodied in inputs, trade and tech-
nology transfer are perfect substitutes and input trade leads to global convergence in the ranking of sectors
by workforce skill.
6 Conclusions
The Stolper-Samuelson prediction for how trade affects wage inequality is premised on the assumption
that the ranking of sectors by skill intensity is invariant across countries. However, industry wage and
educational attainment data imply the sectoral skill allocation differs dramatically between developed and
developing economies. To explain this observation, the paper has developed a new labor assignment model
in which cross-sector differences in the cost and productivity of non-labor inputs shape labor sorting and
cross-country variation in the ranking of sectors by effective non-labor input costs generate assignment
reversals. Embedding the assignment model in an open economy shows that when there is an assignment
35
reversal across countries, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not hold and trade raises wage inequality in
both the developed North and the developing South.
To illustrate the consequences of assignment reversals this paper has worked with a simple two sector,
two country open economy model. An important agenda for future work is to evaluate the quantitative im-
portance of assignment reversals compared to other channels linking trade and wage inequality by allowing
for assignment reversals in a multi-country, multi-sector model with both inter-industry and intra-industry
trade. A multi-sector model would also allow for continuous variation in the correlation between countries’
sector skill rankings in line with the evidence presented in Section 2.1, whereas in the two sector model
assignment reversals are a binary phenomenon. Differences in the relative prevalence of assignment rever-
sals between countries may explain why the effects of trade integration on inequality have varied across
developing countries.
The theoretical tools for solving assignment problems that have been developed in this paper could
be applied to address a wide range of questions that feature multiple productive activities and matching
between two factors of production with non-zero opportunity costs of forming a match. For example, if the
homogeneous input is interpreted as homogeneous unskilled labor, the model can be reinterpreted as a model
of firm hierarchies. Consequently, the assignment model could be used to extend the single sector literature
on globalization and firm hierarchies (Antra`s, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Burstein and Monge-
Naranjo 2009) to a multi-sector world. It would also be interesting to allow for endogenous technical change
in input productivity and analyze the conditions under which profit maximizing R&D leads to assignment
reversals. Finally, the increasing availability of matched employer-employee data opens new opportunities
for testing assignment models and estimating the role of non-labor inputs in determining labor sorting. Such
estimates would also help to discipline attempts to quantify the relevance of alternative sorting mechanisms.
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Appendix A – Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Since F is twice differentiable it is strictly log-submodular if and only if ∂
2 logF
∂θ∂x < 0. Differentiating F
gives:
∂2
∂θ∂x
logF (θ,Qkx) =
Qk
F 2
(FFθx − FθFx),
=
Qk
F 2
FFθx(1− σ),
where the second line uses the fact that the elasticity of substitution of a twice differentiable, constant returns
to scale function F is given by σ = FθFxFFθx . Since F has constant returns to scale and is strictly concave we
must have Fθx > 0. Therefore, F is strictly log-submodular if and only if σ > 1.
Finally, to prove that σ > 1 is equivalent to f (s) being strictly increasing in s differentiate f (s) to
obtain:
∂
∂s
f (s) =
1
f2
(ff ′ + sff ′′ − sf ′2),
=
1
f2
(FθFx − FFθx),
=
FFθx
f2
(σ − 1).
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the case where F is strictly log-submodular. For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} the requirement that sector
k produces positive aggregate output implies there exists θ ∈ (0, θ¯] such that agents with skill θ weakly
prefer sector k to any other sector. Suppose the equilibrium assignment does not exhibit positive assortative
matching. Then there exists l′ < l and θa, θb ∈ (0, θ¯] with θb > θa such that wl(θa) ≥ wk(θa) ∀k and
wl′(θb) ≥ wk(θb)∀k.
However, l > l′ ⇒ Ql > Ql′ ⇒ ψlQl > ψl′Ql′ ⇒ sl > sl′ . Since F is strictly log-submodular, f (s) is
strictly increasing in s and, therefore, it follows from equation (8) above that sl > sl′ ⇒ ddθ
[
wl(θ)
wl′ (θ)
]
> 0 ∀θ.
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Consequently, wl(θa) ≥ wl′(θa) ⇒ wl(θb) > wl′(θb), which contradicts the assumption that there is not
positive assortative matching.
An analogous argument can be used to prove that there is negative assortative matching when F is
strictly log-supermodular.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows the same reasoning used to prove Proposition 1 except ddθ
[
wk(θ)
wl(θ)
]
is given by (9) instead
of (8).
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) follows immediately from equation (10) and Lemma 1 after remembering that span of control is
strictly increasing in θ.
To prove part (ii) let xk(θ) denote input use by a skill θ agent working in sector k. From optimal input
choice (6) we have:
pxk(θ) = ψkθg(θ)f(sk)
f (sk), (18)
which is strictly increasing in θ for given k. Now suppose wk(θ) = wl(θ) and Qk > Ql. Then substituting
(7) into (18) gives:
pxk(θ)
pxl(θ)
=
f (sk)
f (sl)
1− f (sl)
1− f (sk) ,
> 1,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 and sk(θ) > sl(θ). Thus, input expenditure per worker in-
creases discontinuously at the skill thresholds that separate sectors. It follows that input expenditure per
worker is strictly increasing in θ.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Let Ω be an arbitrary subset of agents with skill levels in [θa, θb]. If the mass of agents in Ω is concentrated
at a single point, then there is no inequality between members of Ω. Assume this is not the case and let
θmin = inf {θ ∈ Ω} and θmax = sup {θ ∈ Ω}. Clearly, θmax > θmin.
Let wˆ(θ) = Cw˜(θ) where C is chosen to ensure EΩwˆ(θ) = EΩw(θ) and EΩ denotes an expectation
taken over the subset Ω. Obviously, wˆ(θ) = w˜(θ) ∀θ. Since w(θ) > wˆ(θ) ∀θ ∈ (θmin, θmax) we have
that if w(θ′) = wˆ(θ′) with θ′ ∈ Ω then w(θ) > wˆ(θ) ∀θ > θ′, θ ∈ Ω and w(θ) < wˆ(θ) ∀θ < θ′, θ ∈ Ω.
Remembering that EΩwˆ(θ) = EΩw(θ) it immediately follows that w(θ) and wˆ(θ) satisfy a single-crossing
property on [θmin, θmax] with w(θmin) < wˆ(θmin) and w(θmax) > wˆ(θmax).
Consequently, the wage distribution over Ω induced by wˆ(θ) second-order stochastically dominates the
distribution induced by w(θ). Since wˆ(θ) and w˜(θ) are identical up to a change in scale it follows that for
any measure of inequality that respects scale independence and second-order stochastic dominance wage
inequality among members of Ω is higher when wages are given by w(θ) than when wages are given by
w˜(θ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Since the skill distribution has no mass points the (MC) condition implies that ψ2 → 0 as θ1 → 0 and
ψ2 →∞ as θ1 → θ¯. The (WE) condition implies that ψ2 < 1∀θ1 ∈
(
0, θ¯
]
since if ψ2 ≥ 1 all agents obtain
a strictly higher wage in sector two than in sector one. Differentiating the (WE) condition gives:
(
ψ
1
β
2 f [s2(θ1)]− f [s1(θ1)]
)
g(θ1)θˆ1 − s1(θ1)f ′ [s1(θ1)]
(
Qˆ1 + γˆ
)
=
−ψ
1
β
2 s2(θ1)f
′ [s2(θ1)]
(
ψˆ2 + Qˆ2 + γˆ
)
− (f [s1(θ1)]− βs1(θ1)f ′ [s1(θ1)]) ψˆ2
β
, (19)
where θˆ1 ≡ dθ1θ1 and analogous definitions hold for other variables. Differentiating the (MC) condition gives:
C1θˆ1 = C2
(
1− β
β
ψˆ2 − Qˆ1 − γˆ
)
+ C3
(
ψˆ2 + Qˆ2 + γˆ
)
+ C4ψˆ2, (20)
where:
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C1 ≡
f [s1(θ1)] + βψ 1β2
1− β f [s2(θ1)]
 θ21g(θ1)dM(θ1) > 0,
C2 ≡
∫ θ1
0
θg(θ)
f ′ [s1(θ)]2
−f ′′ [s1(θ)]dM(θ) > 0,
C3 ≡ βψ
1
β
2
1− β
∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)
f ′ [s2(θ)]2
−f ′′ [s2(θ)]dM(θ) ≥ 0, (21)
C4 ≡ ψ
1
β
2
1− β
∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)f [s2(θ)] dM(θ) ≥ 0.
The derivations of (19) and (20) use ψˆ1 = −1−ββ ψˆ2, which follows from differentiating (14). Note that
(19) and (20) allow for variation in Q1, Q2 and γ. This is not necessary to prove Proposition 4, but will be
needed for the proof of Proposition 5.
Let Qˆ1 = Qˆ2 = γˆ = 0. Note that: (i)
ψ
1
β
2 f [s2(θ1)]
f [s1(θ1)]
= 1−
f [s1(θ1)]
1−f [s2(θ1)] > 1 since the span of control is higher
in sector two, and; (ii) f [s1(θ1)] > s1(θ1)f ′ [s1(θ1)]. Therefore, it follows from (19) that the (WE) curve
is strictly downwards sloping on
(
0, θ¯
]
. In addition, equation (20) implies that the (MC) curve is strictly
upward sloping on
(
0, θ¯
]
. Combining these results with the boundary conditions above proves that the (WE)
and (MC) curves have a unique intersection on
(
0, θ¯
)
.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let γˆ = 0. Suppose Qˆ1 = 0, but Qˆ2 > 0. Then, if ψˆ2 ≥ 0 equation (19) implies θˆ1 < 0, but equation (20)
implies θˆ1 > 0 – a contradiction. Therefore, we must have ψˆ2 < 0 ⇒ ψˆ1 > 0. Now suppose ψˆ2 < 0 and
ψˆ2 + Qˆ2 ≤ 0. Then equation (19) implies θˆ1 > 0, but equation (20) implies θˆ1 < 0 giving a contradiction.
Therefore, we must have ψˆ2 + Qˆ2 > 0. Similar reasoning shows that if Qˆ1 > 0 and Qˆ2 = 0 then (19) and
(20) together imply ψˆ2 > 0, ψˆ1 < 0 and ψˆ1 + Qˆ1 = −1−ββ ψˆ2 + Qˆ1 > 0. This proves the claims made in
equation (16).
Given d[ψkQk]dQj > 0, j, k = 1, 2 equations (6) and (11) together imply that
dwk (θ)
dQj
> 0 ∀θ, j, k = 1, 2.
Lemma 2 is then sufficient to conclude that technological progress increases within-group inequality among
any group of agents who all work in the same sector and do not switch sectors following the technology
shock.
If dθ1dQj < 0, agents switch from sector one to sector two following an increase in Qj . Since s2(θ) >
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s1(θ)∀θ, equation (11) implies w2(θ) > w1(θ) ∀θ. Remembering that d
wk (θ)
dQj
> 0∀θ, j, k = 1, 2 this
means that an increase in Qj unambiguously increases w(θ) at any value of θ such that agents switch from
sector one to sector two following the shock. It immediately follows that d
w(θ)
dQj
> 0 ∀θ. Therefore, Lemma
2 implies that income inequality increases among all subsets of agents.
Finally, observe from (19) and (20) that the case where γˆ = χ 6= 0 is equivalent to having γˆ = 0 and
Qˆ1 = Qˆ2 = χ. It immediately follows that
d[ψkγ]
dγ > 0, k = 1, 2 implying that an increase in γ has the same
qualitative effects on the returns to skill and wage inequality as an increase in either Q1 or Q2.
Proof of Proposition 6
The (WE) condition is the same as in the closed economy. It is a strictly downward sloping curve on
(
0, θ¯
]
.
Let ψWE2 be the value of ψ2 at which the (WE) curve intersects the θ1 = 0 axis. Obviously, ψ
WE
2 ≤ 1. The
(MC′) condition implies ψ2 →∞ as θ1 → θ¯. Differentiating the (MC′) condition gives:
C1θˆ1 = C2
(
1− β
β
ψˆ2 − Qˆ1 − γˆ
)
+ C3
(
ψˆ2 + Qˆ2 + γˆ
)
+ C4ψˆ2 + C5
(
1− β
β
ψˆ2 − Qˆ∗1 − γˆ∗
)
, (22)
where C1, C2, C3 and C4 are defined by (21) and:
C5 ≡
∫ θ¯∗
0
θg(θ)
f ′ [s∗1(θ)]
2
−f ′′ [s∗1(θ)]
dM∗(θ) > 0.
Equation (22) implies that the (MC′) curve is strictly upward sloping on
(
0, θ¯
]
. Let ψMC
′
2 be the value of
ψ2 at which the (MC′) curve intersects the θ1 = 0 axis. Equation (17) implies ψMC
′
2 ≤ 1. If ψMC
′
2 < ψ
WE
2
then the (WE) condition and the (MC′) condition must have a unique intersection on
(
0, θ¯
)
and this gives
the open economy equilibrium. If ψMC
′
2 ≥ ψWE2 then equilibrium is given by θ1 = 0 and ψ2 = ψMC
′
2
and in equilibrium both countries specialize in their high productivity sector. This proves the existence of a
unique open economy equilibrium.
The remainder of Proposition 6 follows immediately from the discussion in the main body of the paper.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the home country and assume home is not specialized in equilibrium. Since ψ˜2 < ψ2 and ψ˜1 > ψ1,
equations (6) and (7) imply that w2(θ) > w˜2(θ) and w1(θ) < w˜1(θ)∀θ. In addition, 0 < θ1 < θ˜1 and
the continuity of w and w˜ imply w(θ1) < w˜(θ1) and w(θ˜1) > w˜(θ˜1). Moreover, w(θ) > w˜(θ)∀θ ∈
(θ1, θ˜1). Therefore, invoking continuity once more, w and w˜ must intersect exactly once on (θ1, θ˜1). Trade
liberalization reduces the wage of all agents with skill below the intersection and increases the wage of all
agents with skill above the intersection.
From (6) we have that ψ˜1 > ψ1 ⇒ s˜1(θ) > s1(θ)∀θ. Equation (11) then implies w˜(θ) > w(θ)∀θ <
θ1. Applying Lemma 2 this means that wage inequality within any subset of agents who work in sector one
after trade liberalization is lower in the open economy than in the closed economy. By contrast, ψ˜1Q1 <
ψ˜2Q2 < ψ2Q2 ⇒ w˜(θ) < w(θ) ∀θ > θ1. Consequently, trade liberalization increases wage inequality
within any subset of agents who work in sector two in the open economy.
Similar reasoning can be used to prove the analogous results for the home country when θ1 = 0 and for
the foreign country.
Proof of Proposition 8
Equilibrium is defined by the wage equalization (WE) condition and its foreign equivalent, which are the
same as in autarky, and by the global output market clearing condition:
∫ θ1
0
θg(θ)f(s1)dM(θ) +
∫ θ∗1
0
θg(θ)f(s∗1)dM
∗(θ) =
β
1− βψ
1
β
2
[∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ) +
∫ θ¯∗
θ∗1
θg(θ)f(s∗2)dM
∗(θ)
]
.
From the foreign wage equalization condition, θ∗1 is strictly decreasing in ψ2. Given this relationship it is
easy to differentiate the market clearing condition, as was done in the proofs of Propositions 4 and 6, and
show that it defines a strictly upward sloping relationship between θ1 and ψ2. The market clearing condition
also implies that when θ1 = θ¯, ψ2 > ψ˜∗2 > ψ˜2 implying that in θ1–ψ2 space the market clearing curve sits
above the home (WE) curve when θ1 = θ¯. Let ψWE2 be the value of ψ2 at which the home (WE) curve
intersects the θ1 = 0 axis. Let ψMC
′′
2 be the value of ψ2 at which the market clearing curve intersects the
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θ1 = 0 axis. If ψMC
′′
2 < ψ
WE
2 then the home (WE) condition and the market clearing condition must
have a unique intersection on
(
0, θ¯
)
and this gives the open economy equilibrium. If ψMC
′′
2 ≥ ψWE2 then
equilibrium is given by θ1 = 0 and ψ2 = ψMC
′′
2 . This proves the existence of a unique open economy
equilibrium.
In addition, since the global market clearing condition is simply the sum of the home autarky market
clearing condition (MC) and its foreign equivalent we cannot have ψ2 ≤ ψ˜2 or ψ2 ≥ ψ˜∗2 . In the former
case there is excess global supply of good one, and in the later there is excess global supply of good two.
Therefore, ψ˜2 < ψ2 < ψ˜∗2 . The remainder of the proof follows from the discussion in the main body of the
paper and from using reasoning analogous to that applied in the proof of Proposition 7 to characterize the
effect of moving from autarky to free trade on wage levels and wage inequality.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, consider the case when sectoral outputs are non-traded. In this case equilibrium is given, as in autarky,
by the (WE) and (MC) conditions at home and their foreign equivalents abroad, but with p = 1γ∗ in both
countries. Therefore, for home input trade is equivalent to experiencing an increase in γ in autarky. The
result then follows immediately from applying Proposition 5.
When the sectoral outputs are traded there are multiple cases to consider depending on whether there
exists an assignment reversal and whether production in each country is diversified. However, since the
same reasoning applies in each case I will only give the proof for the case considered in Section 5.1 where
an assignment reversal exists and foreign is specialized in producing good one. In this case equilibrium is
given by the (WE) and (MC′) conditions and differentiating these conditions gives (19) and (22). Input trade
implies γˆ > 0 while Qˆ1 = Qˆ2 = γˆ∗ = 0. Now, if ψˆ2 ≥ 0 equation (19) implies θˆ1 < 0 and equation (22)
then implies ψˆ1 + γˆ > 0. Alternatively, if ψˆ2 < 0 and ψˆ2 + γˆ ≤ 0 then equation (19) implies θˆ1 > 0, but
equation (22) implies θˆ1 < 0 giving a contradiction. It follows that if ψˆ2 < 0 then ψˆ2 + γˆ > 0. Therefore, in
both cases we have ψˆk + γˆ > 0, k = 1, 2. Proposition 9 then follows immediately from applying equations
(6) and (11) and Lemma 2.
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Appendix B – Theoretical extensions
Cross-sector heterogeneity
It is straightforward to modify the production technology in (3) to allow for sources of cross-sector hetero-
geneity other than differences in input productivity. Suppose production in sector k requires a team of Nk
workers and if each worker has skill θ output is given by:38
yk(θ, x) = g(θ)Ak
[
λk (Bkθ)
σ−1
σ + (1− λk) (Qkx)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
. (1′)
Given Assumption 1 we have σ > 1. This formulation allows for cross-sector heterogeneity in team sizeNk,
Hicks-neutral productivity Ak, labor augmenting productivity Bk, non-labor input productivity Qk and the
labor intensity of production λk. I restrict the production function to be a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) technology in order to introduce the CES parameter λk. If λk is not included in the analysis then the
results below hold without imposing functional form restrictions on F .
The same reasoning employed to derive Proposition 1 can be used to characterize the equilibrium as-
signment when output is given by (1′). The structure of equilibrium is unchanged, but agents sort across
sectors based not on the ranking of sectors by Qk, but on the ranking of sectors by Vk where:
Vk ≡
(
1− λk
λk
) σ
σ−1 NkQk
Bk
.
Higher ability agents are assigned to sectors with higher Vk. Consequently, skill levels and wages are
higher, ceteris paribus, in sectors with: (i) higher non-labor input productivity; (ii) lower labor augmenting
productivity; (iii) larger production teams, and; (iv) lower labor intensity.
Interestingly, different forms of technical change have contrasting implications for sorting across sec-
tors. Whereas increases in non-labor input productivity tend to draw more skilled workers into a sector,
labor augmenting technical change has the opposite effect. To understand this result, remember that when
Assumption 1 holds and output is given by (3) higher ability agents sort into sectors with higher spans of
control. If we redefine the span of control to equal the number of efficiency units of input used per efficiency
unit of skill, sk(θ) ≡ QkxBkθ , this insight remains true under the production technology (1′). Labor augment-
38This specification assumes that in equilibrium all members of a team have the same skill level. This will necessarily be the
case if, for example, a team inherits the skill level of its least able member.
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ing technical change reduces an agent’s optimal span of control and, therefore, has the opposite effect to
increases in non-labor input productivity. Similarly, higher labor intensity is equivalent to a simultaneous
rise in labor augmenting productivity and fall in non-labor input productivity and decreases the optimal span
of control. Meanwhile, higher team size increases the output price by raising labor costs, thereby leading to
a greater optimal span of control. Finally, the equilibrium sorting pattern does not depend on Hicks-neutral
productivity Ak because Ak is multiplicatively separable from the production function.
Generalized final good technology
Suppose instead of equation (12), the final good production function is given by:
Z = H(Y1, Y2),
where H is a constant returns to scale function that is strictly increasing in both its arguments, strictly
concave and satisfies limYk→0
∂H
∂Yk
= ∞, k = 1, 2. Obviously, introducing this final good technology
does not affect the existence of positive assortative matching between high skill agents and high technology
sectors.
Let ζ ≡ Y2Y1 . Then cost minimization in final good production and the choice of the final good as
numeraire together imply dψ2dψ1 = −1ζ < 0 and:
h′(ζ)
h(ζ)− ζh′(ζ) =
ψ2
ψ1
, (23)
where h(ζ) ≡ H(1, ζ). Since H is strictly concave, (23) implies ζ is a strictly decreasing function of ψ2ψ1 .
As in the Cobb-Douglas case, equilibrium reduces to a wage equalization condition and a market clear-
ing condition. The wage equalization condition is still given by equation (WE) above, while the market
clearing condition is:
∫ θ1
0
θg(θ)f(s1)dM(θ) =
1
ζ
∫ θ¯
θ1
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ).
By differentiating this expression and using ζ ′
(
ψ2
ψ1
)
< 0, it is straightforward to show the market clearing
condition defines an upward sloping curve in θ1-ψ2 space and that Propositions 4 and 5 continue to hold.
To solve the open economy model note that the open economy market clearing condition is:
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Y1 + Y
∗
1 =
1
ζ
(Y2 + Y
∗
2 ),
where ζ is given by (23). In addition, when there is an assignment reversal across countries foreign will
specialize in good one if and only if:
ζ¯
∫ θ¯∗
0
θg(θ)f(s∗1)dM
∗(θ) ≤
∫ θ¯
0
θg(θ)f(s2)dM(θ)
where h
′(ζ¯)
h(ζ¯)−ζ¯h′(ζ¯) = 1 and ψ1 = ψ2 = h
′(ζ¯).
Using these expressions we can solve for the open economy equilibrium following the same reasoning
applied in the Cobb-Douglas case and Propositions 6, 7, 8 and 9 continue to hold.
Heckscher-Ohlin assignment model
Consider the following variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. There are two industries and two factors of
production and each industry has a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Zj =
(
Y1j
µj
)µj ( Y2j
1− µj
)1−µj
, µj ∈ (0, 1), j = 1, 2,
where Zj is output of industry j and Ykj is the quantity of factor k used in industry j. Assume µ1 > µ2
meaning industry one is relatively intensive in factor one. Now, suppose the factors of production do not
represent the economy’s endowments, but must be produced. Factor k is the output of task k and task
production is governed by the assignment problem in Section 3. Finally, suppose output from the two
industries is combined to produce a final good, which can either be consumed or used as the input in task
production. Output of the final good is given by:
Z =
(
Z1
β
)β ( Z2
1− β
)1−β
, β ∈ (0, 1).
In this set-up factor supplies are endogenous to the equilibrium of the assignment problem. Suppose
task two has higher input productivity than task one, Q2 > Q1. Then, given Assumption 1, high skill agents
will be assigned to task two and low skill agents will perform task one.
Following the same logic used to solve for equilibrium in Section 4.2, it is easy to show the closed
economy equilibrium of this Heckscher-Ohlin assignment model can be characterized by the same (WE)
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and (MC) conditions derived in Section 4.2, except the parameter β is replaced by µ1β + µ2(1 − β).
Consequently, the model has a unique closed economy equilibrium featuring positive assortative matching
between agents and tasks and the effects of technical change on the returns to skill and wage inequality are
as described in Section 4.3.
In the baseline model all workers in the high productivity sector have higher skill than any worker in
the low technology sector. However, in this Heckscher-Ohlin variant each industry employs both high skill
workers to perform task two and low skill workers to perform task one. The equilibrium wage function
ensures employers are indifferent between all workers assigned to a particular task. Therefore, I will assume
the skill distribution of workers employed in each task is the same in both industries. Under this assumption
the average wage wj in industry j is:
wj =
w¯1 + νjw¯2
1 + νj
,
where w¯k is the average wage of agents assigned to task k and:
νj ≡ 1− µj
µj
µ1β + µ2(1− β)
1− µ1β − µ2(1− β)
M(θ¯)−M(θ1)
M(θ1)
.
Unsurprisingly, the mean industry wage is a weighted average of the mean task wages. Note that µ1 >
µ2 ⇒ ν1 < ν2. Therefore, the mean industry wage is higher in the industry that is intensive in the high skill
task. As in the baseline model, shocks to input productivity which switch the productivity ranking across
tasks will reverse the ranking of industries by average wages and average employee skill. It can also be
shown that labor’s share of output is lower in the industry that is intensive in the high skill task.
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Appendix C – Data
UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics database contains employment and compensation data for 127 ISIC Revision
3 manufacturing industries at the 4 digit level. The database starts in 1990, but country coverage varies over
time. The wage variable is defined as the ratio of Wages and salaries to Employment. The sample used in the
paper is selected as follows: (i) for each country the data used is from the latest year between 1995 and 2000
for which wage data is reported; (ii) all industries reporting negative wages and salaries, or with fewer than
10 employees, were dropped; (iii) only countries with data on at least 60% of industries were included.39
The final sample covers 43 countries including the US. The sample countries are: Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, US, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Wage data for the US
is available from 1997-2000. The statistics shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are calculated using US data for
the same year in which a country reported data, unless the data is from 1995 or 1996, in which case US data
from 1997 is used.
UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics database does not include long time series of industry data at the 4 digit
level. Consequently, changes in wage rank correlations are computed using wage data for 3 digit ISIC
Revision 2 manufacturing industries. The 3 digit data covers 28 industries and I drop country-year observa-
tions with wage data for fewer than 80% of industries. I use data from 1965-1995 and compute annualized
changes between the first and the last year in which a country is included in the data set. Only countries for
which the first and the last year are at least 10 years apart are included.
The EU KLEMS data is taken from the March 2008 release of the database. The industry wage rate is
defined as the ratio of Compensation of employees to Total hours worked by employees. The data for 1995
covers 29 countries and, at the most disaggregated level available, 29 manufacturing industries. I use the
NAICS-based data for the US and drop Luxembourg from the sample since it has a higher income per capita
than the US.
The IPUMS-International data includes all 34 countries for which a census taken between 1995 and
39Informal data examination suggests there is substantial noise in the Industrial Statistics database. The 60% coverage cut-off is
designed to select for countries that produce relatively comprehensive industrial statistics, since such countries are likely to report
higher quality data. It also reduces the selection bias that may arise if there is non-randomness in which industries report data. The
results in the paper do not depend on the exact value of the cut-off.
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2005 is available. I use the internationally harmonized educational attainment and industry of employment
variables and drop all respondents for whom either educational attainment or industry is unknown. I drop
the industry labeled “Other industry, n.e.c.”, leaving 15 industries covering the entire economy. Mali is not
included in the regressions reported in Section 2.1 because its extremely low skill rank correlations make it
a clear outlier.
Capital stock per capita is computed from the Penn World Tables 6.3 using the perpetual inventory
method as implemented by Caselli (2005). Human capital per capita is computed from the Barro and Lee
(2001) educational attainment data set. Average years of schooling for the population 25 and over is con-
verted to human capital following the methodology in Caselli (2005).
The fifteen equipment types used to compute the cost of imported capital are: Computers, office and
accounting equipment; Communication equipment; Instruments and medical equipment; Fabricated metal
products; Engines and turbines; Metalworking machinery; Special industry machinery, n.e.c.; General in-
dustrial equipment; Electrical equipment; Autos and trucks; Aircraft; Ships and boats; Railroad equipment;
Furniture and fixtures, and; Agricultural machinery. The 1997 US capital flow table gives equipment invest-
ment for 53 manufacturing industries which I map to ISIC 4 digit industries by combining the concordance
from capital flow industries to NAICS industries in the capital flow table and a concordance from NAICS
industries to ISIC industries from the US Census Bureau. For most industries the capital expenditure shares
only vary at the 2 or 3 digit level. Consequently, I estimate equation (2) with the standard errors clustered
by country-2 digit industry groups.
Equipment trade data is from the NBER-United Nations world trade data set and I use a concordance
from SITC Rev. 2 product categories to US BEA industries obtained from the Center for International Data
to calculate trade in each of the 15 equipment varieties. The geographic variables used to estimate the gravity
equation are from CEPII. The population weighted arithmetic mean distance between major cities is used to
measure distance. The gravity equation is estimated using equipment trade in 2000.
Investment in Table 5 and wages in Table 6 are from UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics database. The
capital, skill and contract intensity variables are defined as the capital stock per worker, the share of non-
production workers in employment and the fraction of inputs neither sold on an exchange nor reference
priced, respectively. The capital and skill intensities are computed using the NBER manufacturing database
for 2000, while contract intensity is taken from Nunn (2007) and is based on US input-output tables in 1997.
To obtain measures of capital, skill and contract intensity for ISIC industries I used concordances between
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NAICS and ISIC Revision 3 industries from the US Census Bureau and Statistics Canada to construct a
concordance that mapped each NAICS manufacturing industry to its primary ISIC counterpart. Capital
abundance is defined as capital stock per capita computed from the Penn World Tables 6.3, skill abundance
is defined as the secondary school enrollment rate from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and
the rule of law is taken from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators for 2000. The countries in the
low income per capita sample are: Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Colombia; Ecuador; Egypt; India; Indonesia;
Iran; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lebanon; Morocco; Peru; Thailand; Turkey; Ukraine; Vietnam, and; Zimbabwe.
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Dependent variable:
Income per capita 0.13 *** 0.075 *** 0.14 *** 0.089 *** 0.055 *** 0.26 ***
(0.016)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.0068)     (0.064)     
Δ Income per capita 0.12 **
(0.052)     
Constant 0.75 *** 0.79 *** 0.70 *** 0.76 *** 0.78 *** 0.0049 *** 0.69 ***
(0.025)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.011)       (0.0012)   (0.036)     
R
2
0.57 0.19 0.36 0.19 0.58 0.06 0.41
N 42 42 42 42 42 70 25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Income per capita is expressed as the log difference from US per capita income.
* indicates coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level, and; *** at 1% level.
Columns (a)-(e) use UNIDO Industrial Statistics wage data covering 127 4 digit manufacturing industries in 2000. 
Columns (b) and (d) use correlations calculated using industry employment shares as weights.
Column (f) uses UNIDO Industrial Statistics wage data covering 28 3 digit manufacturing industries and calculates changes between 1965 and 1995.
Column (g) uses EU Klems wage data covering 29 manufacturing industries in 1995.
(f)
Wage rank 
correlation
(g)
Table 1: International wage structure comparisons
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Wage rank correlation Wage correlation
Proportion 
pairwise rank 
matches
Δ Wage rank 
correlation
Income per capita 0.018 * 0.046 **
(0.010)      (0.020)      
Constant 0.89 *** 0.93 ***
(0.015)      (0.024)      
R
2
0.11 0.33
N 32 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Income per capita is expressed as the log difference from US per capita income.
* indicates coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level, and; *** at 1% level.
Education data is from IPUMS-International and covers 15 industries.
Secondary Tertiary
(a) (b)
Table 2: International industry skill comparisons
Skill rank correlation
Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
Human capital per capita -0.0029
(0.14)         
Secondary enrollment rate -0.022
(0.066)        
Physical capital per capita 0.085 *** 0.095 ***
(0.028)      (0.015)        
Constant 0.72 *** 0.71 ***
(0.038)      (0.025)        
R
2
0.53 0.54
N 32 41
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Human capital, secondary enrollment rate and physical capital are expressed as the log 
difference from their respective US values.
* indicates coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level, and; *** at 1% level.
UNIDO Industrial Statistics wage data covers 127 4 digit manufacturing industries in 2000.
Wage rank correlation
Table 3: Wage structure and factor endowments
(a) (b)
Exporter Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Canada 6.7% 4.6% 2.4% 16.7%
(Electrical apparatus) (Railroad equipment)
China 8.1% 9.5% 0.1% 31.8%
(Aircraft) (Furniture and fixtures)
France 8.4% 4.7% 3.2% 22.8%
(Metalworking machinery) (Aircraft)
Germany 16.8% 6.8% 8.4% 27.9%
(Computers, office and accounting equipment) (Agricultural machinery)
Italy 7.8% 5.3% 1.8% 18.1%
(Computers, office and accounting equipment) (Furniture and fixtures)
Japan 18.7% 14.2% 1.5% 53.0%
(Furniture and fixtures) (Ships and boats)
United Kingdom 7.4% 3.9% 3.7% 16.8%
(Furniture and fixtures) (Aircraft)
United States 26.1% 10.0% 5.0% 44.7%
(Ships and boats) (Engines and turbines)
Revealed advantage computed for 15 equipment types in 2000.
Revealed advantage defined as the exporter's share of total exports of the equipment type by the eight exporters listed in the table.
The equipment types in which each country has its minimum and maximum revaled advantage are listed in parentheses.
Table 4: Revealed advantage in equipment exports
Revealed advantage
Dependent variable:
log Cost of imported equipment -3.395 **
(1.672)        
log Cost of imported capital -9.818 *** -9.396 ***
(3.019)       (3.277)      
Capital interaction 0.014
(0.024)      
Skill interaction -0.080
(0.136)      
Contract interaction 0.242
(0.151)      
Equipment variety dummies Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.74 0.33 0.33
N 514 2891 2707
Standard errors in parentheses. In column (a) standard errors are clustered by country. In columns (b)
and (c) standard errors are clustered by country and 2 digit industry.
All dependent variables expressed in logs.
The R
2
 statistic reports the within  R
2
.
* indicates coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level, and; *** at 1% level.
In column (a) sample includes 15 equipment types in 36 countries in 2000. 
In columns (b) and (c) sample includes 127 ISIC 4 digit manufacturing industries in 36 countries in 2000.
Table 5: Imports, investment and the cost of capital equipment
Imports
(a)
Investment per worker
(b) (c)
Dependent variable:
log Cost of imported capital -3.151 *** -3.639 *** -0.565 -2.234 ** -12.169 *** -12.673 *** -8.772 *** -8.770 ***
(1.080)  (1.235)  (0.841)  (0.891)  (3.459)  (3.599)  (2.009)  (2.146)  
Capital interaction -0.011 0.035 *** 0.020 0.031 ***
(0.009)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.008)  
Skill interaction -0.071 0.099 *** -0.009 -0.010
(0.056)  (0.036)  (0.108)  (0.059)  
Contract interaction 0.087 * 0.073 *** 0.129 0.098 **
(0.045)  (0.024)  (0.088)  (0.048)  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
0.39 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.42
N 3656 3444 3668 3454 1899 1832 1899 1832
Standard errors, clustered by country and 2 digit industry, in parentheses.
All dependent variables, except Wage rank percentile, expressed in logs.
The R
2
 statistic reports the within R
2
.
* indicates coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level, and; *** at 1% level.
In columns (a)-(d) the sample includes 127 ISIC 4 digit manufacturing industries in 36 countries in 2000.
 In columns (e)-(h) the sample is restricted to the 18 countries with income per capita below the sample median.
Wage rank percentileWage
(a) (b) (c)
Wage rank percentile
(g) (h)
Table 6: Cost of imported capital and the inter-industry wage structure
Full sample Low income per capita sample
(d)
Wage
(e) (f)
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Figure 1: Wage rank correlations – UNIDO 2000
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Figure 2: Pairwise industry wage rank matches – UNIDO 2000
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Figure 3: Wage rank correlations – EU KLEMS 1995
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Figure 4: Closed economy equilibrium
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Figure 5: Open economy equilibrium
